DESIGNER DUTY: EXTENDING LIABILITY TO
MANUFACTURERS FOR VIOLATIONS OF LABOR
STANDARDS IN GARMENT INDUSTRY SWEATSHOPS
LEO L. LAMt
The Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") regulates minimum
wage, 2 maximum hours, 3 and child labor,4 making employers
liable to their employees for violations of the Act. A substantial
number of employers, however, particularly in labor-intensive
industries, persistently violate these regulations or standards.
One such labor-intensive industry is today's garment industry,
which is home to small sewing factories that consistently operate
under substandard working conditions in immigrant neighborhoods
throughout the country.5 These factories are commonly known as
"garment sweatshops." The United States General Accounting
Office defines "sweatshop" as "a business that regularly violates both
wage or child labor and safety or health laws." 6 According to
federal and state officials, sweatshops exist throughout the United
7
States.
At the bottom of the garment industry structure resides the
provider of sweatshop labor-the garment worker.8 The garment
t B.S. 1988, UCLA;J.D. Candidate 1993, University of Pennsylvania. I would like
to thank Professor Regina Austin and Professor Clyde Summers for their helpful
suggestions and insightful criticisms. I also thank Dennis Hayashi and Gen Fujioka
of the Asian Law Caucus for recommending and shaping this topic. Above all, I am
grateful to Libby Liu, whose contributions to this Comment were as invaluable as the
efforts of the editors of the Law Review.
' 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1988).
2 See id. § 206.
3 See id. § 207.
4 See id. § 212.

5 See infra notes 30-31 & 64-69 and accompanying text.

6 U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., "SWEATSHOPS" IN NEW YORK CITY: A LOCAL EXAMPLE
OF A NATIONWIDE PROBLEM 1 (GAO/HRD-89-101BR,June 1989) [hereinafter GAO,
NEW YORK CITY]; U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., "SWEATSHOPS" IN THE U.S.: OPINIONS ON
THEIR EXTENT AND POSSIBLE ENFORCEMENT OPTIONS 1 (GAO/HRD-88-130BR, Aug.
1988) [hereinafter GAO, SWEATSHOPS]. The dictionary definition of "sweatshop" is

"a shop or factory in which workers are employed for long hours at low wages and
under unhealthy conditions." WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1191
(1991).
7 See GAO, SWEATSHOPS, supra note 6, at 1-2, 19 (stating, however, that "[n]o

empirical data exists to support or refute [this proposition]"). Apparel sweatshop
conditions have received the most media attention in New York, Los Angeles, and
San Francisco.
8 See Steven A. Chin, Sweatshops: Bay's Ugly Secret, S.F. EXAMINER, Feb. 13, 1989,
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worker is usually a Hispanic or Asian female immigrant9 who
moved to an American metropolis1 ° with her family in search of
economic opportunity. In contrast, at the top end of the industrial
structure sits the foremost beneficiary of garment sweatshop laborthe apparel manufacturer. Unbeknownst to its avid consumers, this
manufacturer is often one of the country's best-known apparel
companies, including designer-name labels such as Guess?"1 and
12
Jordache.
This Comment focuses on the current problems faced by the
worker in the garment sweatshop,13 and argues for the extension
of liability to the apparel manufacturer who engages in contracting
out labor for violations of labor standards that occur in the garment
sweatshop. Part I of this Comment provides a recent example,
which is typical of the plight of the garment sweatshop worker. Part
II describes the garment industry, 14 providing an analysis of the
relationship among the apparel manufacturer, the sweatshop owner,
and the garment worker. In addition, Part II examines the business

at A10 (diagramming the structure of the garment industry).
9 See infra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
1o See infra notes 30-31 & 64-69 and accompanying text.
11Guess? has recently made an effort to do its part in attempting to clean up
garment sweatshops. See infra note 176.
12 See Brian Murphy, Clothing Industry Sweatshops Making a Comeback, CHI. TRIB.,
June 2, 1991, at 8C.
is Seegenerally GAO, SWEATSHOPS, supranote 6, at 32-34 (identifying major factors
believed to be responsible for sweatshops).
14 For a cursory overview of the apparel sweatshop industry, see Danielson v.Joint
Bd. of Coat, Suit and Allied Garment Workers' Union, 494 F.2d 1230, 1234 (2d Cir.
1974) (describing the structure of the garment industry and its fierce competition for
patronage ofjobbers and inside manufacturers); Employing Lithographers v. NLRB,
301 F.2d 20, 26 (5th Cir. 1962) (describing improvements in working conditions for
garment workers resulting from agreements between jobbers and unions); Botany
Indus., Inc. v. New YorkJoint Bd., 375 F. Supp. 485,494 (S.D.N.Y.), vacated on other
grounds sub nom. Robb v. New York Joint Bd., 506 F.2d 1246 (2d Cir. 1974)
(describing thejobber-contractor relationship); GAO, NEW YORK CITY, supra note 6,
at 53-55 (describing the relationship between manufacturers, jobbers, and contractors); GAO, SWEATSHOP, supra note 6, at 35 (discussing the rapid growth of
subcontracting); GuillermoJ. Greiner et al., On Machinesand Bureaucracy: Controlling
Ethnic Interaction in Miami's Apparel and Construction Industries, in STRUCTURING
DIVERSITY: ETHNOGRAPHIC PERSPECTIVES ON THE NEW IMMIGRATION 65, 76-82
(Louise Lamphere ed., 1992) (describing the structure of work and social groupings
common to sweatshops); Diane Yen-Mei Wong & Dennis Hayashi, Behind Unmarked
Doors: Developments in the Garment Industry, in MAKING WAVES 159, 160-61 (Asian
Women United of California ed., 1989) (discussing the origins and structure of the
sweatshop industry).
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structure of the industry and the reasons why a typical garment
worker continues to labor in a sweatshop.
Part III presents the obstacles blocking effective legal recourse
by the garment worker. This Part will address, in particular, why
current attempts at enforcement of labor standards fail, and the
types of defenses used by the manufacturer to avoid liability for the
worker's injuries.
Part IV studies the scope of the FLSA and the tests that
determine whether a sufficient nexus exists between the manufacturer and the shop owner in order to extend to the manufacturer a
legal duty of care towards the garment worker. Part V discusses the
effectiveness of some current enforcement techniques and legislative proposals aimed at correcting sweatshop abuses by imposing
liability on the apparel manufacturer for labor violations committed
in its subcontractor's sweatshop. Part V also advances theories
under FLSA which, in the absence of effective legislation, can be
used to judicially extend liability to the manufacturer.
Part VI analyzes the exceptions made for the apparel industry in
the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA")1 5 under the garment
industry proviso. 16 Part VI propounds that extending liability to
the manufacturer squares well with the special treatment afforded
to the garment industry under the NLRA.
This Comment concludes that while Congress struggles with the
enactment of legislation that would explicitly make the apparel
manufacturer liable for labor violations occurring in garment
sweatshops run by contractors, courts can and should interpret
current labor laws to impose liability on that manufacturer. More
specifically, the current state of the law coupled with the unique
nature of the apparel industry enables judicial extension of liability
to the manufacturer; and such an extension will ameliorate the
current circumstances of the garment industry.
I. A RECENT EXAMPLE
On July 13, 1991, Raymond Kong and his wife, Nor Yee, closed
the doors of eight sewing shops they owned 17 in San Francisco and
29 U.S.C. §§ 151.69 (1988).
1Id. § 158(e).

's

17 This problem has been a long-standing one throughout the United States. See,
e.g., Susan Sward & Bill Wallace, Problemsat S.F. Garment Shops, S.F. CHRON.,July 25,
1991, at Al, A15 ("In a shrinking industry squeezed by recessionary pressures and
intense competition from foreign manufacturers, financial collapse is not new....
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one in Oakland without any notice. At that time they owed more
than $300,000 in back wages to the over 450 seamstresses who were
put out of work.18 The Kongs, who were reportedly bankrupt, 19
disappeared. Rumors quickly surfaced that they had fled the
country, conveniently leaving behind all financial and moral obliga20
tions to their sewing shop workers.
The abandoned employees were mostly Southeast Asian
immigrants, who had little or no understanding of English and even
less understanding of their labor rights as employees. This scenario,
unfortunately, illustrates the plight of a great number of garment
21
workers.
In a fortunate turn of events for the Kongs' workers, the
International Ladies Garment Workers Union ("ILGWU") provided
help in filing claims for lost wages and in preventing large creditors
from seizing the Kongs' assets before the lost wages were paid.22
Furthermore, Byer California, a clothing manufacturer which held
production contracts with the Kongs, paid $200,000 to the State
Labor Commissioner's Office to help cover the unpaid wages of the
workers in an act of apparent goodwill.23
Although the Kong case illustrates the experience of garment
sweatshop workers, it differs from the typical case in certain salient
aspects. First, most sweatshop owners do not possess assets that
come close to covering their liabilities to their employees. 24 In
[Elpisodes like [this] are indicative of a larger industry problem.").
18 See Bay Area Sewing-Shop Owner Sought, S.F. CHRON., July 22, 1991, at A13; Bill
WallaceJudge OrdersBack Payfor Garment Workers: Hundreds Lost Jobs When Couple's
Shops Folded, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 21, 1991, at A13.
19 See Wallace, supra note 18, at A13.
20 Dennis Hayashi, who represented the workers, provided this information. At
the time, Hayashi was a labor attorney with the Asian Law Caucus, a civil rights, nonprofit legal service organization in San Francisco. Communication with Dennis
Hayashi (Summer 1991) [hereinafter Communication with Hayashi].
21 Garment sweatshop owners often fall into financial problems causing them to
lock up their shops and disappear. See Sward & Wallace, supra note 17, at Al, A15.
The low cost of opening up a sewing shop facilitates the practice of relocating shops
by shop owners. See infra notes 38.40, 107 and accompanying text. This mobility
poses a constant threat to the job security of the garment workers.
22 See Bill Wallace, StateJoins U.S. in Probe of Garment Firm: Labor Agencies Share
Data on FailedBay Area Company, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 8, 1991, at A16.
23 See Kim'Vang Dang, Byer CaliforniaDonates $200,000 to Pay Workers at Closed
Contractor;Women's Apparel Wholesaler,WOMEN'S WEAR DAILY,July 26, 1991, at 9; Bill
Wallace & Susan Sward, Tax Liens Filed Against FailedS.F. Garment Firm: IRS Seeks
$75,000 Withheldfrom Wages, S.F. CHRoN.,July 26, 1991, at A18.
24 See infra notes 38-43, 111-14 and accompanying text.
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addition, the Kong case attracted widespread media attention, which
helped the workers secure assistance from the union and provided
the incentive for the large manufacturer Byer California to donate
money to help the workers recover lost wages. A majority of the
cases do not generate any media attention, and thus public
sentiment, either because they are too small or because they simply
are not reported by the workers.2 5 Finally, it is extremely uncommon for a manufacturing company (such as Byer California) to take
affirmative steps on supposedly moral grounds to help redress the
injuries suffered by garment workers, especially when the case lacks
26
the magnitude of media attention applied in the Kong case.
Garment workers need sufficient legal means through which
they can obtain relief from the injuries they sustain. Adequate relief
cannot be accomplished by solely targeting the direct employer-the
garment shop owner or contractor-for liability because the shop
owner often has either insufficient or non-existent assets. 27 The
true beneficiary of the sweatshop system in the apparel industry, the
manufacturer, should also be accountable for the problems that
28
plague the industry.
II.

NATURE OF THE GARMENT INDUSTRY

The United States' garment industry is a very profitable one.
Revenues in

California alone gross billions of dollars annually.

29

25 See infra notes 82-85, 89-102 and accompanying text.
26 See e.g., Dang, supra note 23, at 9 ("'Buyer [Byer California] approached us and

voluntarily contributed the money. A gesture like that happens infrequently.'"
(quoting Henry Huerta, Senior Deputy Labor Commissioner of California)).
27 Vicious competition among sweatshop contractors puts many contractors in
marginal financial conditions. See infra notes 41-43, 216-18 and accompanying text.
Part II, infra notes 34-46 and accompanying text, discusses the position
occupied by the manufacturer or the retailer in the garment industry. Part IV, infra
notes 130-64 and accompanying text, looks at current labor law to find a nexus by
which courts can hold manufacturers liable for labor violations committed by their
contractors. Essentially, the contention is that, in most cases, the manufacturer not
only directly benefits from such violations, but also indirectly controls the conditions
under which garment sweatshops operate; these operations constitute an integral part
of the regular business of the manufacturer. The legal conclusion propounded in this
comment is that typical case-by-case facts can adequately form the basis for denying
apparel manufacturers who contract with sweatshop operators the use of the
employee-contractor distinction. Under these circumstances, the manufacturer can
be viewed as an "employer" of the sweatshop owner and thus can become liable for
violations of the labor rights of the garment workers.
29 The San Francisco areaitself has a five-billion-dollar-a-year industry, employing
over 10,000 workers, most of whom are Chinese women. See Sward & Wallace, supra
note 17, at Al; see also Bob Baker, Union TargetsSweatshop Operators,L.A. TIMES, Apr.
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The three largest apparel centers in the United States are New York
City, Los Angeles, and San Francisco,"0 but this far-reaching
industry also extends to many major cities in the South and
31
Southwest such as Miami, New Orleans, and San Antonio.
Nationwide, garment workers number over one million and the
32
industry is dominated by small companies.
The characteristics of the domestic apparel industry manifest
many inherent economic advantages for manufacturers.
For
example, manufacturers have exceedingly favorable bargaining
power relative to shop owners. It is ironic, therefore, that workers
operate under "sweatshop" conditions in a substantial portion of the
garment factories centered around our big cities. Furthermore,
although a grave disparity in economic benefits exists between
manufacturers and sweatshop workers, the apparel sweatshop
33
situation has not received significant attention in legal literature.
Appreciation for a proposal to impose manufacturer liability
requires an adequate understanding of the industry-an overview of
its unique organization and characteristics.

27, 1990, at B3 (noting that there are approximately 90,000 garment workers in the
garment district of downtown Los Angeles); Harry Bernstein, Labor: Sweatshops a
Complex Problem, L.A. TMEsJuly 10, 1990, at D3 (estimating industry revenues at six
billion
30 dollars a year in San Francisco).
See Sward & Wallace, supra note 17, at Al.
31 See GAO, SWEATSHOPS supra note 6, at 26; infra notes 68-70 and accompanying
text.
32 See Sward & Wallace, supra note 17, at A15.
33 So far, two law review works have addressed garment sweatshop conditions and
offered possible improvements. These two works document the sweatshop conditions
in garment factories centered in or around San Francisco's Chinatown in the 1970s
and 1980s. See Harold P. Dygert III & David Shibata, Chinatown Sweatshops: Wage
Law Violations in the Garment Industiy, 8 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 63, 64-68 (1975)
(examining the problem of wage law violations in San Francisco's Chinatown garment
shops); Barbara E. Koh, Note, AlterationsNeeded: A Study of the DisjunctionBetween the
Legal Scheme and Chinatown Garment Workers, 36 STAN. L. REV. 825, 827-35 (1984)
(describing the plight of immigrants who work in Chinatown garment sweatshops).
On the other hand, the overall garment sweatshop conditions themselves have been
proliferously described in books, news articles, and legislative materials.
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A. Business Structure and Roles
The basic chain of business' in the apparel industry consists
of: the retailer, usually a department store or boutique; the
manufacturer,3 5 for example, Levi-Strauss; the contractor (or a
"subcontractor" relative to the manufacturer) or shop owner; and
the garment worker. The largest profit margins are achieved at the
top of the chain: the profit per garment to the retailer (typically
greater than a 100 percent markup to the consumer) usually exceeds
twice the profit to the manufacturer, which in turn exceeds twice
36
that to the contractor.
The manufacturer occupies the top position in the business
chain: it designs the particular piece to be produced and dispatches
the job to contractors. The manufacturer also provides the fabrics
to be used. Some manufacturers may have their own cutting
facilities, and a few may even have their own sewing and assembly
factories. Calculation of the estimated retail price to consumers
incorporates the labor costs, material costs, and the desired profit
margin. The contractors run and own garment shops where they
employ cutters, seamstresses, trimmers, and pressers to produce the
garment.
Because of the traditional contracting system, the manufacturer,
under typical circumstances, is relieved of any "direct" responsibilities to the garment workers, since they are technically employed by
the contractor or shop owner.3 7 Thus, any liability for violations
of labor standards in garment shops is generally assumed by the
contractor, who is considered the culpable party. A closer look at
34 The chain ofproduction in the apparel industry has remained virtually the same
since the 1920s and 1950s. For a description of the industry as it existed in that era,

see JACK HARDY, THE CLOTHING WORKERS: A STUDY OF THE CONDITIONS AND
STRUGGLES IN THE NEEDLE TRADES 149-65 (1935).
35 The generic term "manufacturer" includes "jobbers." Jobbers design and
merchandise apparel, and contract out sewing and pressing to the contractors.
Jobbers are manufacturers who do not perform their own production. In the past,
"jobbers" simply referred to producers of women's wear, whereas "manufacturers"
referred to men's clothing. See id. at 153. This Comment will treat manufacturers
and jobbers as the same since they perform basically the same functions.
6 Se, e.g., Chin, supra note 8, at A10 (breaking down the profit for a $120 skirt
as follows: profit to the retailer is $60; profit to the manufacturer is $25; profit to the
contractor is $10 at a cost to the contractor of $25, of which only $2.40 goes to the
worker).
37 See infra notes 133-64, 180-90 & 198-200 and accompanying text (discussing
definition of the terms "employer" and "employee," and analyzing employeecontractor distinction); infra notes 191-97 & 201-04 and accompanying text (applying
analysis to garment industry).
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the apparel production contracting system, however, provides
insight into the contractor's dilemma.
Many garment contractors began as sweatshop workers them38
selves who saved enough money to start their own shops.
Starting a sewing shop requires relatively little capital. Typically, all
that is needed is the money to purchase or lease a few sewing
machines, rent space, and obtain a business permit.3 9 Sometimes
an entire family will work in a factory to save enough money to go
into the sewing business for themselves. 40 Lack of education and
business management experience, however, usually puts the
contractor in a position of very limited bargaining power relative to
the manufacturer.
Another reason for the disparate distribution of bargaining
power is that the ease of entry into the contracting business results
in a large number of shop owners competing among themselves,
forcing them to lower their contracting bids to win business from
manufacturers. 4 1 The overabundance of contracting shops and the
resulting underbidding competition between contractors compels
them to cut either the workers' wages, or their profits, or both.4 2
The knowledge that there are always other shops eager to take any
manufacturer's order for a minimal profit poses a constant threat
to the individual contractor.
Meanwhile, manufacturers benefit from this competition and
often deliberately pit contractors against each other to achieve the
lowest possible price. 43 The sweatshop system prevails because
manufacturers find substantial savings in using low-priced labor
See Dygert III & Shibata, supra note 33, at 64; Koh, supra note 33, at 828; Liz
Mullen, Korean Business People FindProsperity in Contract Garment Work, L.A. Bus.J.,
Feb. 4, 1991, at 32, 36.
39 See Dygert III & Shibata, supra note 33, at 64; See Wong & Hayashi, supra note
14, 40
at 160.
See Constance L. Hays, ImmigrantsStrain Chinatown'sResources,N.Y. TIMES, May
30, 1990, at BI, B4 (interviewing Professor Betty Lee Sung, Chairwoman of the Asian
Studies department at City College in New York).
41 See HARDY, supra note 34, at 156; Wong & Hayashi, supra note 14, at 160; Koh,
supra note 33, at 827-28; Mullen, supra note 38, at 36.
42 See HARDY, supra note 34, at 156; Dygert III & Shibata, supra note 33, at 64;
Wong & Hayashi, supranote 14, at 160; William Serrin, CombatingGarmentSweatshops
Is an Almost Futile Task: The New Sweatshop, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1983, at BI.
43 See JACK CHEN, THE CHINESE OF AMERICA 238 (1980); Dygert III & Shibata,
supranote 33, at 64; Koh, supra note 33, at 828. As previously indicated, this type of
situation accurately depicts the apparel industry structure even as it existed 60 years
ago. See HARDY, supra note 34, at 156, 161-63.
58
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contracts rather than maintaining their own sewing and assembly
labor force. Through subcontracting, the manufacturer can save on
expenses such as overhead and rent. In addition, as discussed
above, the manufacturer has access to a virtually unlimited supply
of contract labor without any responsibility to the labor force.
Avoiding responsibility for the conditions under which the garment
worker labors is perhaps the foremost reason for the development
of the contracting system."4 Moreover, this system allows the
manufacturer to avoid any concerns with production details and to
focus on generating designs based on market developments. 45 The
use of contracted labor allows the manufacturer to calculate
production costs with complete disregard for the costs and
circumstances of labor, and the great fluctuations in volume that
46
result from the apparel industry's seasonal variations.
B. Exploitation of Immigrant Labor
Recently, apparel manufacturing firms have shifted their
operations from foreign countries to the United States in efforts to
avoid stiff import quotas and shipping costs. 4 7 Some manufacturers who had originally moved factories abroad (to locations such as
Asia and Central America) from the United States in the 1960s and
1970s in search of cheap labor are now moving operations back
home. 48
Uncertain political outlooks (particularly in Hong
Kong49 and parts of Latin America), increased labor costs abroad,
and instances of poor workmanship have further spurred domestic
50
production.
44 See CHEN, supra note 43, at 237; Dygert III & Shibata, supra note 33, at 65; see
also HARDY, supra note 34, at 155-56 (discussing the savings deliberately incurred by
manufacturers in utilizing the system of sub-manufacturing).
45 See Dygert III & Shibata, supra note 33, at 65.
46
See e.g., HARDY, supra note 34, at 205-07 (describing general problems
associated
with "seasonal" employment of clothing workers).
47
See Chin, supra note 8, at Al.
48
See Stephanie Strom, U.S. GarmentMakersCome Home, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8,1991,
at DI.
49 Hong Kong reverts from British rule back to China in 1997.
50 See Strom, supra note 48; see also Elizabeth Hudson, Silencing Sewing Machines,
La Mujer Obrera Strikes, WASH. PosT, May 30, 1991, at A3 (statement of Cecilia
Rodriguez, founder of La Mujer Obrera, a women's activist group in El Paso, Texas,
noting that even as larger manufacturers move to third-world countries where labor
is cheaper, workers in the United States are exploited by smaller sweatshops that open
and close quickly and frequently).
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Fortunately for the industry, the rapidly expanding flow of
immigrants, both legal and illegal,5 1 into major cities in the United
States coincides with the growing demand for domestic apparel
production. This influx of immigrants provides a large pool of
52
easily exploited workers to meet the production demand.
Currently, Hispanics and Asians account for nearly the entire labor
force in the apparel industry.5 Women are also overrepresented
in the apparel industry. 54 These new immigrants are driven to
sweatshop employment by their financial needs as well as their lack
of English language skills, creating a situation ripe for exploita-

tion.

55

51 See GAO, SWEATSHOPS, supra note 6, at 34-35; see, e.g., Hays, supra note 40, at
B4 (citing statistics that show an increase in the number of legal-from 24,787 in 1985
to 28,717 in 1988-and apprehended illegal-from 196 in 1987 to 984 in 1989immigrants from China alone, with far more suspected than are caught). Illegal
immigrants generally fall into two categories: those who overstay their visas and those
who are smuggled into the country. See id. Smuggling networks operate over the
east, west, and south coasts of the United States, often charging anywhere between
$30,000 and $50,000 dollars per person without any guarantees. See id; Al Kamen,
A Dark
Roadfrom China to Chinatown, WASH. POST, June 17, 1991, at Al.
52
See Chin, supra note 8, at Al, A10; see also Linda S. Bosniak, Exclusion and
Membership: The Dual Identity of the Undocumented Worker Under United States Law,
1988 Wis. L. REV. 955, 982, 1021-24 (discussing cases that have held that undocumented workers are covered by the terms of the federal labor protection statutes);
Kenneth B. Noble, InvestigatorsFind Sweatshops Are in Resurgence, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4,
1988, § 1, part 1, at 26 (addressing parallel problems of sweatshops in both apparel
and restaurant industries).
53 At the turn of the century, Jewish and Italian immigrants made up nearly the
entire labor force in the industry. See HARDY, supra note 34, at 18; WILLIAM M.
LEISERSON, ADJUSTING IMMIGRANT AND INDUSTRY 206-07 (1969). These demographics
have since changed. See GAO, SWEATSHOPS, supranote 6, at 2, 23-24 (estimating 60%
Hispanic and 35% Asian); Noble, supra note 52, sec. 1, part 1, at 26 (also estimating
60% Hispanic and 35% Asian); see also BETTY LEE SUNG, A SURVEY OF CHINESEAMERICAN MANPOWER AND EMPLOYMENT 82-83 (1976) (commenting that Chinese
immigrants have supplanted Jewish and Italian laborers in the garment industry).
54 See Alex Stepick, Miami's Two Informal Sectors, in THE INFORMAL ECONOMY:
STUDIES IN ADVANCED AND LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 111, 117 (Alejandro Portes
et al. eds., 1989); Wong & Hayashi, supra note 14, at 159.
55
See GREGORY DEFREITAs, INEQUALITY AT WORK: HISPANICS IN THE U.S. LABOR
FORCE 113 (1991) (arguing that Hispanic workers in the apparel industry are more
vulnerable to employer violations of labor standards than white workers); R.G.
Gregory et al., Why Are Low-Skilled Immigrants in the United States Poorly PaidRelative
to Their Australian Counterparts?,in IMMIGRATION, TRADE, AND THE LABOR MARKET
385,389-405 (John M. Abowd & Richard B. Freeman eds., 1991) (analyzing earnings
gaps between immigrants and native-borns in the United States and Australia in the
textile, clothing, and footwear industries).
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1. Sweatshop Conditions
The most common violations occurring in garment sweatshops
are sub-minimum wages and lack of overtime pay. 56 Shop owners
57
often pay their workers less than half the federal minimum wage.
Moreover, shop owners frequently violate child labor laws by
employing under-aged children for work weeks that surpass the
maximum number of hours allowed per week under the FLSA. 58
Beyond financial wage-related hardships lie the physical
hardships that the garment worker must endure. 59 The typical
garment sweatshop environment is damp and hot,60 cramped with
56 See GAO, SWEATSHOPS, supra note 6, at 8. According to Dennis Hayashi,
"garment sweatshops go unchecked, with rampant violations of wage and hours laws."
Communication
with Hayashi, supra note 20.
57
See, e.g., Testimony of ILGWU PresidentJay Mazurat LaborDepartmentHearingon
Homework in the Women's Apparel Industry, Daily Lab. Rep., Apr. 4, 1989, at DI
(statement of Mazur: $65-70 for 50 hours per week of work) [hereinafter Testimony,
Daily Lab. Rep.]; Chin, supra note 8, at A10 (1989: $2.00 an hour for 12 hour work
days); AM. FEDERATIONIST, Aug. 2, 1986, at 10 (commenting that "wages [were]
commonly
as low as $1 to $1.50 an hour") (testimony of Mazur).
5
8 See U.S. GEN. AcCT. OFF., CHILD LABOR VIOLATIONS AND SWEATSHOPS IN THE
U.S. 3 (GAO/T-HRD-90-18, Mar. 1990) [hereinafter GAO, CHILD LABOR]; GAO, NEW
YORK CITY, supra note 6, at 8-9 (describing the situation of a Mexican immigrant boy
who worked in a shop which was so cold that "workers could run their fingers under
the cutter and not even know it"); GAO, SWEATSHOPS, supra note 6, at 21; Michael
Specter, Illegal Child Labor Surging in U.S.: Immigrant Schoolgirls Toil in Modern-Day
Sweatshops, WASH. POST, Apr. 14, 1991, at Al. A sweep of 200 San Francisco
sweatshops found more than 70 shops in violation of child labor laws. Experts
suspect that the problem is worse in New York City's Chinatown alone. See id. at A8.
59 One journalist recently rated a garment worker's occupation as one of the ten
worstjobs in the nation. See Tom Juravich, The 10 WorstJobs in America Are Making
Millions Miserable, STAR TRIB., Sept. 3, 1991, at IlA (noting that garment workers
work for sub-minimum wages and at substandard conditions).
" The dampness and heat result from the lack of space, which forces shop owners
to place the boilers for the pressers in the same room as the sewing machines. See
William Serrin, After Years of Decline, Sweatshops Are Back, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1983,
at Al. Serrin also gives the following description:
Often garment industry workers must walk three or four flights to their
factories, up dark, dingy, littered hallways. Elevators, when they exist, are
often old and small and overburdened; it would take too long to wait for
them.
Cloth seems to fly through the machines as the seamstresses make
blouses, skirts, dresses, trousers.
The factories hum with the noise of machines-electric cutting knives,
sewing machines, pressing machines. Radios play loudly, and there is the
babble of foreign languages and the steam and smell of the food that
workers often eat at their benches. Floors often are littered with cloth
remnants and stacked with cut goods or rolled goods. The factories are hot
or cold, depending on the season.
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piles of highly flammable materials, poorly lit, with blocked exits,
battered doors, and grime-coated windows; it is generally unsafe and
unsanitary.61 Inside, one can find each seamstress sitting in a
crowded space, wearing a surgical mask if lucky, otherwise improvising with pieces of cloth over her face to prevent excessive inhalation
of lint and dust, "hunched over a sewing machine.., pushing fabric
62
past a speeding needle as quickly as her hands [can] manage."
According to a report issued by the General Accounting Office,
safety and health hazards include "overcrowded rooms with poor
ventilation, stairways in disrepair, unsanitary bathrooms, children
playing near dangerous cutting machines, and workers preparing
food next to their machines and eating from plates on littered
63

floors."

In New York City alone, there are an estimated 6000 garment
shops, 64 including "at least 2000 unlicensed shops in lofts, back
rooms and garages." 65 In over 5000 investigations since 1987, the
State Labor Department has found in addition to 2100 unregistered
shops, 500 minimum wage violations, 2000 reports of unsafe
working conditions, and over 600 child-labor violations. 66 In San
Francisco, out of 1300 inspections of garment shops, state investigaId. at B4.
61 See Michael Freitag, New York Is FightingSpread of Sweatshops, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.

16, 1987, at Al. Many in the industry recall the 1911 fire which struck the Triangle
Shirtwaist Company in New York and killed 146 workers. Labor and fire officials
believe that conditions in today's sweatshops are just as hazardous. See Firefighters
Salute Victims of Triangle Disasteras Union Members Rally, PR NEWSWIRE, Mar. 28,
1989.
62 Chin, supra note 8, at Al (asserting that many workers' experiences are often
worse than they would have endured in their countries of origination).
63 GAO, NEW YORK CITY, supra note 6, at 8.
" The General Accounting Office estimated in 1989 that 7000 apparel
manufacturing firms operate in New York, including 4500 sweatshops and over 1200
which are not evien registered. See GAO, NEW YORK CITY, supra note 6, at 22 (citing
estimates from the state's Apparel Industry Task Force); Hal Taylor, U.S. Report Labels
Over Half of NYC's Makers as Sweatshops, WOMEN'S WEAR DAILYJune 28, 1989, at 15.
The State Labor Department estimated that 70% of the contractors in New York City
"'do not meet the minimum requirements and have a blatant disregard for the laws.'"
Freitag, supra note 61, at B4. "Pinpointing the actual number of shops is impossible.... Many seem to open and close overnight, either to avoid being investigated
or to relocate to sites where rent is cheaper. And once located, the boarded-up
windows and metal gates make them virtually inaccessible to non-employees." Chin,
supra note 8, at A10.
65 Brian Murphy, supra note 12, at 8C.
6 See id.
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tors found violations of labor standards in seventy-two percent of
67
the shops, and issued 952 citations.
Apparel sweatshops, however, do not exist only in New York and
California; they exist "wherever a large, illegal alien workforce [is]
willing to work for sub-minimum wages." 68 Labor officials have
inspected and reported sweatshops in a wide range of cities such as
Chicago, Dallas, Miami, and Washington, D.C., each of which is
69
home to a substantial immigrant population.
To exacerbate the situation, the increasing number of small
subcontractors 70 makes it difficult to compile accurate statistics on
conditions and violations. The low cost of opening shops and the
instability of workloads due to seasonal variations contribute to a
very mobile industry. 71 Even if comprehensive statistics were
gathered, however, they might not accurately represent workers'
wages and hours because shop owners are able to circumvent wage
and hour standards by the methods of compensation utilized.
a. Piecework Wage System
72
The piecework wage system, long-established in the industry,
describes the process by which most garment workers are paid. A
worker is paid for each garment she assembles or produces instead
67

See Sward & Wallace, supra note 17, at A15 (concluding that there was a total
of over $1 million in fines). A 1990 ILGWU survey of 230 downtown shops in San
Francisco found 60% payingbelow the minimum wage and 80% not paying overtime.
See id.
6 Rick Pullen, HarshPenaltiesUrgedforSweatshopOperators,ApparelManufacturing
Sweatshops, WOMEN'S WEAR DAILY, Oct. 14, 1988, at 15 (noting that the GAO found
that 100 New Orleans apparel sweatshops employed 5000 workers); see also GAO,
SWEATSHOP, supra note 6, at 2.
69 The five mentioned cities were home to over one-fifth of the estimated 9.8

million legal and illegal aliens counted in the 1980 census. See GAO, SWEATSHOPS,
supra note 6, at 47. Of the respondents to a GAO sweatshop survey in the 49 states
(all except Oregon), only those from Alaska and Hawaii believed that sweatshops were
not a problem in their respective states. See id. at 24-26. Those states that reported
serious or multiple problems in the apparel industry included New York, California,
New Jersey, Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Pennsylvania,
Florida, Louisiana, Texas, Oregon, and even Washington, D.C. See id.

70 See id. at 35 (citing dramatic increase in number of contractors with less than
20 employees). The Census Bureau in 1982 estimated that over 40% of the domestic
apparel shops employed fewer than 10 persons. See Pullen, supra note 68, at 15.
7' Analysts blame the difficulty of estimation on the "high turnover and frequent

movement of the shops." Alexander Reid, Thriving Sweatshops Feed on Immigrants'
Desirefor
Work, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1986, at B2.
72
See HARDY, supra note 34, at 191-93 (commenting on compensation by piece

rates in the 1920s and 1930s); Koh, supranote 33, at 828; Serrin, supranote 60, at B4.
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of for the amount of time she works. Because of this system, wages
can vary over a very wide range since the pay depends on how fast
73
a seamstress works; the faster she sews, the more she will earn.
Piecework wage employers characterize the system as efficient
because it provides workers with an incentive to work quickly.
Labor officials, however, argue that the piecework wage system
affords contractors a pretext for avoiding compliance with the
minimum wage law and is just one of the ways of circumventing
74
labor standards.
b. Homework
Shop owners also send seamstresses home with piecework to be
completed for the next day in order to avoid paying legally
mandated overtime wages.7 5 Violations of homework laws 76 tend
to coincide with violations of child labor laws because the tight
financial circumstances of garment families often force children to
77
participate in the work process, especially in domestic settings.
Homeworkers usually buy all their own equipment and pay for
work-related utilities and transportation costs. 78
Homework
contributes to the inaccurate recording of hours worked,7 9 thereby
providing shop owners with another means of hiding noncompliance with wage and hour laws. While sweatshop owners and
contractors continue to find creative ways to avoid compliance with
7- Wages can run as low as $1.00 an hour and as high as $9.00 an hour at a rate
of a few cents per item completed; a typical skirt would involve sewing two darts, a
waistband, and a zipper, and cutting a slit. See Serrin, supra note 60, at B4. Pressers
make even less. See CHEN, supra note 43, at 237.
74 Critics say "it makes the workers both slave driver and slave." Serrin, Decline,
supra note 60, at B4.
75 See CHEN, supra note 43, at 237; HARDY, supra note 34, at 217-18 (arguing that,
despite repeated attempts to regulate homework, it was a widely accepted business
practice during the 1930s).
76 See 29 U.S.C. § 211(d) (1988).
77 See Testimony, Daily Lab. Rep., supra note 57, at D2 (testimony of ILGWU
President Jay Mazur at a hearing on homework in the women's apparel industry).
Supporters of homework argue that it provides the employee with greater work
flexibility. See id.

78 See id.

71 Many garment workers do not keep homework records for two reasons. First,
they fear it will cause their shop owners to have problems with labor officials. See id.
at D3; see also text accompanying infra note 100. Second, many workers are "nonEnglish-speaking immigrants" who are "unsophisticated" and simply incapable of
"keeping painstaking records." Testimony, Daily Lab. Rep., supra note 57, at D3; see
also infra notes 89-94 and accompanying text (addressing lack of English skills).
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labor standards, garment workers are unable to use affirmative
means to assert their labor fights.
2. Lack of Unionization
Unionization may be a key to protection of the garment worker,
but studies show that the overwhelming majority of sewing shops
are non-union shops.8s There is some evidence that unions help to
improve working conditions. In recent years, wages have declined
in all but unionized factories, which are primarily located in the
Northeast.

81

Garment workers who are illegal aliens often choose not to
participate in unions because they fear an increased possibility of
deportation if they draw attention to themselves. 82 Furthermore,
a continuing tradition of exclusionary and discriminatory practices
in union memberships discourages many garment workers from
seeking membership.8
Most non-union garment workers are
" In 1989, for example, studies estimated that as many as 400 of the approximately 500 sewing shops in the San Francisco area were non-union shops. See Chin, supra
note 8, at A10 (basing its estimate on information supplied by Asian Immigrant
Women Advocates, a workers' education group based in Oakland, California). No
more than a few thousand of the estimated 90,000 workers in the garment district in
downtown Los Angeles are organized. See Baker, supra note 29, at B3. Overall, the
membership of the ILGWU has "plummeted to 150,000 from 300,000 in the last 10
years." Id. at B4. Today, there are 5000 registered garment shops in California. See
Bill Wallace, State Agency to Raid 'Sweatshops".• Tough Enforcement of Labor Laws
Planned at Garment Factories,S.F. CHRON., Aug. 23, 1991, at B4. Workers in the
thousands of small shops, including sweatshops, are so desperately in need of work
that they would not risk their jobs in order to improve working conditions. Most of
the sewing shops, therefore, are not unionized. See Serrin, Combating,supra note 42,
at B1, B4.
81 See Bernstein, supra note 29, at D3; see, e.g., Wong & Hayashi, supra note 14, at
120 (95% of New York Chinatown garment workers belong to the ILGWU compared
to 1% in San Francisco).
12 Some survey evidence suggests, however, that the likelihood of union
membership increases, even for undocumented aliens, with the duration of residence
in the United States. See DEFREITAS, supra note 55, at 234; see generally Catherine L.
Merino, CompromisingImmigration Reform: The Creation of a Vulnerable Subclass, 98
YALE L.J. 409, 415-16, 423 (1988) (noting that undocumented workers appeal to
potential employers "precisely because they will not report working conditions and
employment arrangements that violate federal and state statutes"); M. Patricia
Fernandez-Kelly & Anna M. Garcia, Informalization at the Core: Hispanic Women,
Homework, and the Advanced CapitalistState, in THE INFORMAL ECONOMY: STUDIES IN
ADVANCED AND LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 253 (Alejandro Portes et al. eds., 1989)
("[W]hether because of lack of information, fear, or the need to maximize a meager
income, most underground workers avoid compliance with the law, in collusion with
the 8employers who frequently abuse them.").
3 See SUNG, supra note 53, at 124; see, e.g., HERMAN FELDMAN, RACIAL FAcTORS
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further deterred from unionization because they not only fear that
the union will fail to support them, 84 but they also suspect
that
85
better.
any
conditions
working
make
not
will
unionization
Evasion of the union is a primary reason for the very existence
of the contracting system.8 6 The contracting system provides the
manufacturer the option of sending work to small, mobile, nonunion shops that can easily evade union surveillance, instead of
much larger in-house production plants that are easy to locate and
thus subject to union supervision. 8 7 The very nature of the
industry, therefore, hinders movement towards union control. The
manufacturer often utilizes the contracting system itself as an antiunion measure.88 Although unionization might cure violations, it
would appear that the sheer size of the apparel industry would
relegate attempts at mass unionization to long-term endeavors.

IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY 92, 108, 115, 221-22 (1931) (describing racial tensions
reflected in unions in the early twentieth century); LEISERSON, supra note 53, at 21014 (arguing that ethnic tension caused the Amalgamated Garment Workers to split
off from the United Garment Workers in 1914); Wong & Hayashi, supra note 14, at
170-71 (noting the resistance of some local unions to the needs of their Asian
members).
84 See, e.g., Dygert III & Shibata, supra note 33, at 78 (noting the "strained
relationship" between the ILGWU and Chinatown garment workers, resulting largely
from the union's ineffective policing of its contracts).
85 See CHEN, supra note 43, at 237; Serrin, supra note 42, at 1, B4. For example,
one author argues that the ILGWU might fear possible layoffs due to increased
foreign competition if female workers obtain pay equity increases relative to male
workers. See NORMA M. RICCUCCI, WOMEN, MINORrrIES, AND UNIONS IN THE PUBLIC
SECTOR 159-61 (1924) (noting that Sol Chaikin, president of the ILGWU, argues for
general wage increases, rather pay equity increase, in an effort to avoid foreign
competition).
86 See Danielson v.Joint Bd. of Coat, Suit & Allied Garment Workers' Union, 494
F.2d 1230, 1234 (2d Cir. 1974); HARDY, supra note 34, at 156.
87 See HARDY, supra note 54, at 156; see also supra notes 38-40; infra note 107 and
accompanying text (discussing factors and effects associated with the mobility of the
garment shops). The mobility of the shops contributes to the prevalence of runaway
shops in the industry. See Employing Lithographers v. NLRB, 301 F.2d 20, 26 (5th
Cir. 1962) (observing that the contracting system is constantly changing and garment
workers are difficult to organize); Wong & Hayashi, supra note 14, at 165-66.
8 The factors mentioned here are by no means exhaustive. A complete discussion
of the relationships involved between garment workers and unions goes beyond the
scope of this Comment. Here the concern is with the effect of those relationshipsthat is, the lack of unionization.
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3. Lack of Other Options
The primary factor confining garment workers to their occupations is the lack of English skills.8 9 Many seamstresses, moreover,
are untrained for any other type of work: 9 "most believe that
sewing is their sole means of survival in this country." 91 Even
academically and professionally trained immigrants resort to toiling
92
in garment sweatshops. For example, many former engineers,
teachers, 93 and architects94-all professionals in their country of
origin-are now sweatshop laborers in the United States. This
system puts additional pressure on current garment workers who
must face the reality that incoming immigrants, hungry for any job,
can easily replace them.
Seamstresses often choose to work in garment shops because
shops owners accommodate their family obligations and schedules. 95 More fundamentally, the majority of garment workers are
simply tolerant of "life's harsh struggles," 96 and are accustomed to
third-world working conditions.

89 Illiteracy in English precludes people from many job opportunities. Thus,
immigrants who speak no English whatsoever are limited to even fewer employment
opportunities. See, e.g., Wong & Hayashi, supra note 14, at 161-62 (providing
examples of the effects of a lack of English skills in Asian immigrants); Hays, supra
note 40, at B1, B4 (noting that many garment workers, although overqualified for
labor, have no other employment opportunities).
manual
90
See CHEN, supra note 43, at 237; Wong & Hayashi, supra note 14, at 161-63.
91 Chin, supra note 8, at A10.
92 See Hays, supra note 40, at BI, B4.
IsSee id. at B1.
9 See Chin, supra note 8, at Al.
Is As true today as it has been for decades, many seamstresses do not believe that
they are being exploited. They cite their own minimum job skills, and the absence
of strict work controls such as time-punching, for their general job satisfaction.
See CHEN, supra note 43, at 237. They are able to drift in to work after seeing their
husbands off to work and children off to school; take time out to shop for the family;
pick up their children; bring their small children with them to the shop; and if they
want to do extra work, they can even take it home at piecework rates (illegally). See
id.
96 For example, as one journalist writes:
They have survived war, prison, famine, terrifying voyages across pirateinfested seas and long stints in refugee camps. Now, in the land of their
dreams, thousands of Vietnamese immigrants spend long days hunched over
sewing machines in sweatshops ....
Some earn as little as $1 an hour. Most are glad to get it. Beside them
toil Latino immigrants who have fled impoverished homelands ....
Sonni Efron, Sweatshops In Suburbia: Old Problem, New Twist, L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 26,
1989, at Al.
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4. Lack of Complaints from Garment Workers
Just as new immigrants are generally unfamiliar with American
culture, garment workers are usually unaware of their labor rights.
In fact, they have an inherent distrust of the legal system derived
from their experiences in their home countries. This contributes to
the ineffectiveness of the ILGWU's attempts to organize garment
97
workers, as discussed above.
More importantly, garment workers typically believe that they
are at the mercy of the shop owner. They feel lucky to have jobs
and are desperate to keep them. 98 This provides garment workers
with multiple rationales against bringing forward a complaint.
First, complaining about pay or mandatory overtime can mean
facing a retaliatory dismissal and being blacklisted at other local
apparel shops. 99 Second, garment workers believe that if officials
discover any labor violations in their workplaces, this will force shop
owners out of business, leaving the workers themselves without
jobs. 10 0 Third, as discussed above, undocumented workers fear
that filing an official complaint may not only fail to improve shop
conditions, but may also lead to investigations of their individual
101
immigration statuses and possible deportation.
Some employees even develop personal relationships with their
supervisors or shop owners. For instance, employees may, despite
97 See supra notes 80-88 and accompanying text. One journalist writes, "Many of
these women are from countries where union equals communism equals bad."
Michael Robertson, Empowering the Women of the Sweatshops, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 24,
1990, at B3, B5.
98 See e.g., supra note 95 and accompanying text (discussing some of the benefits
garment workers perceive in their occupations).
99 See Chin, supra note 8, at AIO:
It is not uncommon for workers to give supervisors and bosses gifts of
liquor and food just to stay in favor with them.
"Ifyour supervisor tells you to sit there, you sit there; if he tells you to
kneel, you kneel," said one outraged seamstress who ... requested her
name not be used for fear of losing her job.
See also Wong & Hayashi, supra note 14, at 164-65 (giving reasons why garment
workers ignore problems in sweatshops).
100 Communication with Hayashi, supra note 20.
101 Most undocumented workers have a fear of Anglo authorities in general.
Without a green card, an illegal alien is likely to take any job and work under any
conditions. See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 12, at 8C (interviewing an illegal alien from
the Dominican Republic). Sometimes the worker is afraid that an investigation will
lead to penalties for illegally supplementing personal income with welfare payments.
See Clean Up the Sweatshops, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1989, at B6.
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being exploited, perceive culturally based obligations or loyalties to
the shop owner for providing work and financial security, albeit at
subsistence level.10 2 Thus, without any form of outside remedy,
the typical garment worker's experience will remain dismal.
I.

OBSTACLES BLOCKING EFFECTIVE LEGAL RECOURSE

A. Lack of Adequate Enforcement

Cutbacks in labor law enforcement at both state10 3 and federal
levels have indirectly contributed to the exploitation of immigrants
in apparel sweatshops. A lack of resources committed to the
enforcement 10 4 of state and federal worker-protection laws renders labor regulations inadequate. 05 Budget cuts at both state
and federal levels have forced the government to understaff
that handle labor inspections in sweatagencies and departments
10 6
industries.
shop
The lack of stringent enforcement, however, is not the sole
problem, particularly when such enforcement is directed only at the
102 Some shops actually survive and provide employment for several successive
generations of workers from one family. Communication with Dennis Hayashi, supra
note 20; see, e.g., Specter, supra note 58, at A8 ("It is common for women.., to bring
their infants to work with them. When they are old enough, they learn to help...
or make some other contribution .... ").
103 For instance, Jose Millan, California's Senior Deputy Labor Commissioner,
while estimating that two-thirds of the state's garment shops are in violation of state
licensing and registration law, claims that his agency has been spread thin in the
struggle to enforce labor standards covering other industries such as agriculture. See
Sward & Wallace, supra note 17, at A15; see also GAO, SWEATSHOPS, supra note 6, at
36-48 (offering an account of the limits on enforcement in general).
104 The two main federal enforcement agencies are the Wage and Hour Division
("WHD") and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration ("OSHA"), both of
which are within the Department of Labor.
105 In its report on sweatshops, the GAO noted that government regulations are
ineffective because of the limited coordination among enforcement agencies, the
insufficient staff resources under inspection priorities, and the inadequate penalties
for violations under present law. See GAO, SWEATSHOPS, supra note 6, at 2-3, 36-48.
10
6 See GAO, NEW YORK CITY, supra note 6, at 3, 32-40 (reporting a lower than
10% inspection rate); GAO, SWEATSHOPS, supra note 6, at 45-47 (estimating that 16%
of apparel shops were inspected by WHD and 14% by OSHA between 1983 and
1987); Bernstein, supra note 29, at D3 ("[C]ompanies abusing workers must first be
caught, and there aren't enough labor law enforcement officers to make the
exploiters give more than a fleeting thought to that remote possibility."); Noble, supra
note 52, sec. 1, part 1, at 26 (noting that sweatshop operations are not a top priority
for agencies such as OSHA). Some simply feel that the government cares little about
the exploitation of the garment worker. See Fernandez-Kelly & Garcia, supranote 82,
at 253-54.
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sweatshop owner. Even if garment workers were to seek legal
protection from or remedies for violations of their labor rights, the
law would not accommodate them sufficiently.
B. Lack of Adequate Relieffrom Sweatshop Owners

1. Problems of Proof
Labor investigators regularly face evidentiary problems created
by sweatshop owners' false or missing wage records. Owners can
always relocate, using new equipment and new workers. 10 7 As a
result, garment workers, afraid of driving shop owners elsewhere,
refrain from filing complaints and feel compelled to overstate wages
and understate hours in order to protect their bosses' businesses
10 8
and thus their own jobs.
Moreover, as discussed earlier, the piecework wage system and
the practice of homework enable shop owners to circumvent
standards for minimum wage and overtime pay. 1°9 Dubious and
107 As discussed in Part II, operating a sewing shop requires a minimal monetary

investment. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text. It is generally easy for the
shop owner to relocate in search of cheaper-or more obedient-labor by simply
transporting equipment (sewing machines and pressers can be readily moved) to the
new location or re-renting equipment at that location. A constantly relocating
sweatshop operation is commonly known as a "stitch-and-ditch" business. Communication with Hayashi, supra note 20. "Stitch-and-ditch" shops are analogous to runaway
shops, which are temporarily closed and relocated by employers for anti-union
puroses.
T0 A three-month investigation in Sacramento, California, in which a reporter
went undercover as a sewing shop operator, revealed the following:
- Timecards usually do not reflect actual hours worked and it is normal
for workers to labor 12 hours a day, six days a week when San Francisco
manufacturers are ordering. In one shop, new employees sign time cards
and never see them again.
- Some employees are paid by check but must split the money with others
who are not listed in the shop's records. Others are paid in cash so they can
illegally receive welfare payments, a practice that also violates federal withholding
laws.
- In some cases workers pay their employers to fill out forms stating they
earned more than they did, later translating into higher unemployment benefits
from the state.
Regional News: Calfornia,PROPRIETARY TO THE UNITED PRESS INT'L, Feb. 10, 1985.
109 See supra notes 72-79 and accompanying text. The practice of homework also
violates health and safety standards since many garment workers live in ghetto
residences thatare, not surprisingly, ill-suited for performingfactory-volume cutting,
sewing, and assembly functions.
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even outright fraudulent record-keeping can insulate the shop
owner from investigative or judicial findings of labor law violations.
2. Inadequacies of Available Remedies
Regulations aimed at removing sweatshop conditions in the
garment industry, like the FLSA, have generally focused on the shop
owner and not the manufacturer. State regulations, 110 such as
registration and licensing requirements for sewing shops that
employ more than a certain number of workers; sanctions against
the distribution of industrial homework to employees; signposting
requirements that facilitate the locating of shops by labor officials;
and requirements for employee record-keeping, all entail penalties
against the shop owners for any discovered violations. These
regulations, however, are ineffective for several reasons.
First, even if back wages and damages are recoverable, such as
in the Kongs' situation, 111 such potential recovery is usually
insufficient to prompt an employee to risk losing her job 112 and
being blacklisted1 1 for breaking ranks and creating dissension.
Furthermore, many shop owners who violate wage and hour laws or
owe back wages are insolvent. Thus, the garment worker is further
deterred from initiating a lawsuit by the futility of seeking damages
114
from an insolvent party.
Furthermore, penalties such as those under the FLSA 115 are
generally inadequate to deter potential violators. 116 Because of
a lack of federal sanctions, shop owners are less likely to comply
with labor regulations.11 7 Even when state penalties are imposed
110 See e.g., CAL. [LAB.] CODE §§ 2670-82 (West 1989 & Supp. 1992) (California
apparel industry regulations); N.Y. [LAB.] LAW §§ 340 to 316-b (McKinney 1986 &
Supp. 1992) (New York apparel industry and industrial homework regulations).

112

See supra notes 17-26 and accompanying text.

See supra notes 82, 89-101 and accompanying text.

113 Beingblacklisted eliminates aworker's future employment opportunities, and
can also result in ridicule or social ostracism. Communication with Hayashi, supra
note 20.

114 One seamstress described an episode in which her employer pressured his
employees to return their checks-which were in fact awarded by the labor
commission for back wages-in order to keep their jobs. See Chin, supra note 8, at
A10.
115 For example, the FLSA does not explicitly establish monetary penalties for
record-keeping
violations. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1988).
1 16

See GAO, NEW YORK CrTy, supra note 6, at 3, 40-41; GAO, SWEATsHOPs, supra
note1176, at 47-48.

See Pullen, supra note 68, at 15 (statement of Representative Charles E.
Schumer of New York).
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which increase with repeat violations,1 18 sweatshop owners generally consider paying fines (on the rare occasions when they are
caught) as simply a cost of conducting business.11 9 The penalties,
when assessed, are often inconsequential compared to the total
profits earned from sweatshop labor. 120 The profits generated by
sweatshop labor simply exceed the cost of the penalties for labor
standard violations given the low probability that those penalties
might be imposed.
These inadequacies, among others, of limiting liability for labor
violations to the shop owner demonstrate the need to expand the
scope of liability to include the manufacturer, since the manufacturer benefits the most from the structure of the garment industry.
Emphasis, then, should shift from penalizing shop owners for labor
standard violations to deterring manufacturers from patronizing
sweatshop labor.12 1 Manufacturers, however, have been able to
absolve themselves of their complicity in perpetuating sweatshop
conditions.
C. Lack of Adequate Relieffrom Manufacturers
The manufacturer enjoys not only the benefits of the fierce
bidding competition between sweatshop contractors to win and keep
production contracts, but also moral and legal insulation from
liability to the garment workers for violations of their labor rights.
118 Representative Schumer of New York proposed a bill, which would have

established criminal sanctions and allowed authorities to seize garments, but this bill
failed to pass. See Murphy, supra note 12, at 8C.
119 "[Fines are] a cost of doing business.... They put it in the file with the
electric bill and the telephone bill." Serrin, Combating, supra note 42, at B4
(statement ofJoseph Danahy, ILGWU's organizing director).
120 See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 29, at D3 (explaining that penalties are a
negligible cost, totaling less than one-fiftieth of one percent of the industry's gross
revenue); Sonni Efron, "Hot Goods" Law Revived as Anti-Sweatshop Tool, L.A. TIMEs,
Nov. 28, 1989, at A3 (noting that California enforcement efforts have made only a
small dent in the sweatshop industry). The sweatshop owner who does secure a
production contract can only afford to hire seamstresses to work under sweatshop
conditions in order to sustain profit margins. Keeping the garment workers
employed under sweatshop conditions is also the only way the shop owner can afford
to underbid the competition for contracts with the manufacturer. Thus, the market
provides incentives for the shop owner to circumvent labor standards at all stages of
the bidding game, and it perpetuates the existence of sweatshop conditions in the
apparel industry. See id. at A18-A19.
121 See Efron, supra note 96, at A38 ("Some argue that labor police have never
succeeded in crushing sweatshops in the past and are unlikely to do so now because
the market demands them.").
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The major policy argument against manufacturer liability is that
under a free-market theory, an ignorant buyer should not be held
accountable for the seller's wrongdoings.
Many manufacturers claim or feign ignorance with respect to the
deplorable conditions under which garment sweatshop employees
work, and the labor violations that exist therein. 122 Manufacturers defend themselves against liability by arguing that an imposition
of liability would unfairly force them to subsidize the monitoring of
their subcontractors for labor law compliance. 12 Opposers of
manufacturer liability assert that the burden of regulation of the
garment industry should rest upon the government and not the
manufacturers. 12 4 They also deny the existence of any barriers
that prevent victimized workers from suing manufacturers in
court.

125

In addition to these moral justifications, manufacturers can
claim legal insulation from compliance with the worker protection
provisions of the FLSA 126 for the garment workers by invoking
the employee-contractor distinction.1 27 An independent contractor is one who contracts to do something for the contractee but who
is not controlled by the contractee or subject to the contractee's
control with respect to the manner in which the performance of the
122 See Bernstein, supra note 29, at D3. Manufacturers often insist that they are
not responsible for or aware of the "highly publicized abuse of workers on the
contractors' payroll" while supposedly "[r]espectable companies ... don't like the
sleazy portion of their industry, and... deplore[] it." Id.

See infra note 174 and accompanying text; see also Ralph Frammolino,
Legislation TargetingSweatshops Vetoed, LA. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1990, at A29 (reporting
that the former Governor of California rejected manufacturer liability legislation on
these grounds).
124 See id. Former Governor of California, George Deukmejian, upon vetoing a
proposed manufacturer liability bill, claimed that the bill, if signed, would assign to
manufacturers "'the impossible duty of constantly overseeing their business associates
for labor law violations or be liable for those violations.'" Teresa Simons, Deukmejian
Vetoes GarmentSweatshop Bill, PROPRIETARY TO THE UNITED PRESS INT'L, Aug. 24, 1990
(quoting former Governor Deukmejian).
125 See Frammolino, supra note 123, at A29.
126 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1988).
127 If the sweatshop owner is effectively treated as an "employee" or agent of
rather than an "independent contractor" to the manufacturer, then the manufacturer
becomes liable for violations of the labor rights of garment workers by the sweatshop
owner. For examples of the historical treatment of independent contractor status in
employer-employee relationships, see American Fed'n of Musicians v. Carroll, 391
U.S. 99 (1968) (musicians); Local 24, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283
(1959) (truckers); Columbia River Packers Ass'n v. Hinton, 315 U.S. 143 (1942)
(fishermen).
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contract is undertaken.1 2
The FLSA sets labor standards and
regulations in an employer-employee relationship. "Independent
contractors," however, do not fall within the FLSA definition of
"employee," 12 9 and the status of the garment sweatshop owner as
an independent contractor can free the manufacturer from liability
for labor law violations occurring in the sweatshop. In the absence
of adequate forms of protection for the garment worker, the legal
immunity of the manufacturer must be re-evaluated.
IV. SCOPE OF FLSA
Judicial precedent makes it clear that U.S. labor laws extend
protection to undocumented aliens as well as citizen or resident
workers in the United States."' On the other hand, no precedent
has involved the extension of liability to any manufacturer for labor
128 See
1 29

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2 (1958).
See e.g., Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 728-31 (1947)
(applying employee-contractor distinction). Congress clearly intended to exclude
independent contractors from the definition of"employee" and used the agricultural
processing industry as a parallel example:
[T]he minimum wage provisions of this Act [should] be extended to certain
sharecroppers and tenant farmers. The test of coverage for these persons
will be the same test that is applied to determine whether any other person
is an employee or not.... Coverage is intended in the case of certain socalled sharecroppers or tenants whose work activities are closely guided by
the landowner or his agent. These individuals, called sharecroppers and
tenants, are employees by another name.... True independent-contractor
sharecroppers or tenant farmers will not be covered; they are not employees.
H.R. REP. No. 1366, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1966) (emphasis added), reprinted in
Jeanne M. Glader, A Harvest of Shame: The Impositionof Independent ContractorStatus
on Migrant Farmworkers and Its Ramificationsfor Migrant Children, 42 HASTINGS LJ.
1455, 1456 n.10 (1991).
130 The Supreme Court in Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883 (1984), held that
the term "employee" under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) includes
undocumented aliens since the NLRA did not list undocumented or illegal aliens in
its specifically enumerated exemptions. See id. at 891-92; see also NLRB v. Apollo Tire
Co., 604 F.2d 1180, 1182 (9th Cir. 1979) (recognizing that the NLRB consistently
interprets "employee" under the NLRA to include aliens). The Supreme Court
moreover found that the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") does not make it
unlawful to hire an illegal alien and reasoned that its decision would remove the
benefits to the employer (such as substandard wages and working conditions) of
hiring illegal aliens, thereby providing less incentive for aliens to enter the United
States illegally. See Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 892-94. See generally Bosniak, supra note 52,
at 982, 1021-24 (commenting on the Sure-Tan Court's treatment of undocumented
aliens); Merino, supranote 82, at 422-23 (adding that the protection of undocumented
aliens adds to the protection of lawful workers).
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law violations in apparel sweatshops that perform contracted jobs.
An analysis, however, of the language, legislative intent, and judicial
interpretation of the FLSA demonstrates that despite the inadequate
protection and remedies garment sweatshop workers have so far
received, the law is clearly intended to protect them.
A. Language and Intent
The FLSA was enacted to remove the types of "deleterious
13 2
working conditions" 13 1 that exist in garment sweatshops.
The FLSA definition of "employer" includes "any person acting
directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an
employee."13 3 Similarly, the FLSA broadly defines "employ" to
include "to suffer or permit to work." 13 4 Such expansive language 3 5 indicates that Congress intended to achieve legislative
remedial purposes despite "legal" barriers posed by artificial or
1 36
deceptive contractual veils.
The legislative history of the FLSA1 3 7 reveals that Congress intended to give the Act a broad reach. A primary purpose of
the FLSA is to protect workers with little or no bargaining power:13
the lowest paid, hardest worked, and least organized.
131 Glader, supra note 129, at 1468.
132 Cf [1C] ARTHUR LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 43.42,

at 8-23 (1991) ("[C]ompensation law is concerned... with injuries to [the employee]
as a result not only of his own activities (controlled by the employer as to details) but
of those of co-employees, independent contractors and other third persons (some
controlled by the employer, and others not).").
133 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (1988).
134

Id. § 203(g).

135 "The term 'employee' is defined by most statutes to include every person in

the service of another under any contract of hire, express or implied." LARSON,
supra note 132, § 43.00, at 8-1.
136 See, e.g., U.S.v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704,711-12 (1947) (denouncing"adroit schemes"
by employers to avoid responsibilities imposed by legislation to benefit employees).
137 The Senate report on proposed 1966 amendments to the FLSA discussed the
legislative intent of Congress and provided that:
The Fair Labor Standards Act was enacted in 1938 to meet the
economic and social problems of that era. Low wages, long working hours,
and high unemployment plagued the Nation, which was then in the midst
of an unprecedented depression. The policy of the act, as set forth therein,
was to correct and as rapidly as practicable to eliminate labor conditions
detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard of living necessary
for health, efficiency, and general well-being of workers.
S. REP. No. 1487, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-3 (1966).
138 "'These are the most exploitable people, the least educated, who don't know
their rights.'" Pullen, supra note 68, at 15 (quoting the aide to Representative Charles
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Today's typical garment sweatshop worker fits that description. It
is unlikely that the drafters of the protective legislation meant to
preclude garment workers from relief for violations of their labor
rights on the basis of the employee-contractor distinction (with
respect to the sweatshop owner),1 3 9 which is meant to free a
contractee from responsibility for the actions of a contractor whose
manner of executing a contracted job is subject to little or no
control by the contractee. Today's garment sweatshop worker will
not receive the protection that the FLSA requires unless liability is
extended to the manufacturer.
B. JudicialInterpretation

The scope of the legislative intent behind the FLSA is wide, and
judicial interpretation of the expansive language in the FLSA has
been correspondingly broad. 140 Judicial interpretation has resulted in the development of two different tests for deciding cases
involving the employee-contractor distinction: the right-to-controldetails test and the relative-nature-of-work test.
1. Restatement (Second) of Agency and the Right to Control Details

Endless varieties of cases involving a labor relationship have
invoked judicial construction of the term "employee." Indeed,
judicial interpretation of the term "employee" has "probably
produced more reported cases than any definition of status in the
modern history of law." 141 Most courts, however, have agreed
that the tests for determining employee-contractor status are similar
to that given in the Restatement (Second) of Agency. 142 Without a
E. Schumer of New York).
139

This Comment will later propose legal theories under which liability can be

judicially extended to the manufacturer. See infra notes 180-218 and accompanying
text.
140 See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Seafood, Inc., 867 F.2d 875, 877 (5th Cir. 1989) ("The
remedial purposes of the FLSA require the courts to define 'employer' more broadly
than the term would be interpreted in traditional common law applications.")
(footnote omitted).
141 LARSON,

supra note 132, § 43.10, at 8-1.

142 See id., at 8-3, 8-6. Larson draws an analogy between employee and servant
(under the RESTATEMENT) for common law purposes. See id. at 8-2. The RESTATEMENT provides that:
[i]n determining whether one acting for another is a servant or an
independent contractor, the following matters of fact, among others, are
considered:
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concrete set of rules, the interpretation of the employee-contractor
143
distinction has involved case-by-case factual determinations
based upon ten factors listed in the Restatement. 1 These include
the extent of control over the details of work and the type of
145
occupation involved.
Common law application of the Restatement resulted in the
emergence of the right to control the details of the work-or,
alternatively, the extent of such control-as the single most important factor. 146 An evaluation of the employee-contractor distinction based on this factor is known as the right-to-control-details
test.147

The underlying principle of the right-to-control-details

test is that the more control the superior (or "master") has over the
work of the subject (or "servant"), the more appropriate it is148for the
superior to assume responsibility for the subject's actions.
(a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may exercise over
the details of the work;
(b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or
business;
(c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality, the work
is usually done under the direction of the employer or by a specialist without
supervision;
(d) the skill required in the particular occupation;
(e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the instrumentalities, tools,
and the place of work for the person doing the work;
(f) the length of time for which the person is employed;
(g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job;
(h) whether or nor the work is a part of the regular business of the employer;
(i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relation of master
and servant; and
(j) whether the principal is or is not in business.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) (1958).

143 See, e.g., Magenau v. Aetna Freight Lines, 360 U.S. 273, 278 (1959) (holding
that the existence of an employer-employee relationship is for thejury to determine).
144 See LARSON, supra note 132, § 43.20, at 8-6.
145 See id. §§ 43.20-43.30, at 8-6 to 8-10.
145
See id. § 43.30, at 8-10; Patricia Davidson, The Definition of "Employee" Under
Title VII: DistinguishingBetween Employees and Independent Contractors,53 U. CIN. L.
REV. 203,207 (1984) (noting that "[i]t is this element of control that distinguishes the
employer-employee relationship from the independent contractor relationship at
common
law").
147
See infra notes 183-97 and accompanying text (applying the test to the structure
of the garment industry).
148 Analogous to respondeatsuperior,the manufacturer would be liable for an injury
to a person, or property, of another resulting from the actions of the shop owner,
which was committed within the scope of the shop owner's "employment." The
extension of liability to the manufacturer is also supported by an analysis of the
economics involved in the doctrine of vicarious liability. For example, Alan Sykes
contends that the efficiency of vicarious liability, at least in part, turns on the agent's
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2. Economic Reality Doctrine and Relative Nature of Work
In NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc.,14 9 the Supreme Court
advanced a broad interpretation of the terms in the NLRA.150
The Court held that the statute was not to be construed solely
under common law standards and legal classifications but rather
that it "must be understood with reference to the purpose of the
15 1
Act and the facts involved in the economic relationship."
The approach, adopted in Hearst, of analyzing the purpose of
social welfare legislation 152 and the underlying economic facts of
a case in determining employee-contractor status became known as
the "economic reality" doctrine.1 53 A subsequent trilogy of cases,
United States v. Silk, ] 54 Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb,1 55 and
Bartels v. Birmingham,156 affirmed this approach in analyzing
legislation that followed the NLRA, including the FLSA.
The Silk Court reasoned that:
a constricted interpretation [of the terms in the FISA]... would
only make for a continuance, to a considerable degree, of the
difficulties for which the remedy was devised and would invite
adroit schemes by some employers to avoid the immediate burdens
157
at the expense of the benefits sought by the legislation.

ability to payjudgments under a rule of personal liability. See generally Alan 0. Sykes,
The Economics of VicariousLiability, 93 YALE L.J. 1231, 1239-55 (1984) (suggesting that

the rule of vicarious liability is almost always more efficient than personal liability in
the event of agent insolvency, regardless of the principal's ability to observe the
agent's "loss-avoidance" behavior).
149 322 U.S. 111 (1944).

150 SeeHearst,322 U.S. at 129 (stating that the term "employee" should be defined
broadly, taking into account "the history, context, and purposes of the Act" as well
as the specific relationship in question). The NLRA regulates relations between
employers and employees, covering unfair labor practices. See National Labor
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1988).
Hearst,322 U.S. at 120, 129.
152 See, e.g., Davidson, supra note 146, at 209-10 ("[T]he statute must be
151

interpreted in light of the evils to be corrected and the end to be achieved.").
1f3 Larson distinguishes the economic reality concept from thinking of the
"employee category as a fixed and immutable one, for all times and for all purposes."
LARSON, supra note 132, § 43.41, at 8-11.
'54 331 U.S. 704, 713-14 (1947) (interpreting the meaning of "employee" under
the Social Security Act (SSA)).
155 331 U.S. 722, 723, 728-31 (1947) (assessing the scope of "employee" under the
FLSA).
1'5 332 U.S. 126, 130-32 (1947) (interpreting the meaning of "employee" when

applied to social legislation).
157 Silk, 331 U.S. at 712 (footnotes and citations omitted).
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On the same day that Silk was decided, the Rutherford Court held
that the existence of an employer-employee relationship does not
depend on formalities constructed by the employer; 158 rather it
depends on circumstances of the whole activity. The Court noted
that the FLSA provided comprehensive definitions that should be
interpreted broadly enough to cover persons and relationships that,
before the enactment of the FLSA, did not fall under the employeremployee classification. 159 The economic reality doctrine was
made explicit in Bartels, where the Court established that "employees are those who as a matter of economic reality are dependent upon
160
the business to which they render service."
Hence, the economic reality doctrine can be summarized as
follows: "the term 'employee' when used in social and labor
legislation should be interpreted in light of the purpose of the
legislation."161 Based on this principle, the economic reality
doctrine has evolved into a comprehensive determination of the
nature of the work in relation to the regular business of 3the
16
superior.162 This is known as the relative-nature-of-work test.
The relative-nature-of-work test can be viewed as a test of the
degree of exclusivity involved in the relationship between the
superior and subject. That is, the test can turn on the degree of
integration between the responsibilities or actions of superior and
subject; and the degree of the subject's dependence on the superior.
Courts that have interpreted the employee-contractor distinction
under either of the two tests have appeared to shift the emphasis
from the right-to-control-details test to the relative-nature-of-work
158 The Court found that"[w]here the work done, in its essence, follows the usual
path of an employee, putting on an 'independent contractor' label does not take the
worker from the protection of the Act." Rutherford, 331 U.S. at 729.
159

160

See id. at 728-29.

Bartes, 332 U.S. at 130 (emphasis added).
LARSON, supra note 132, § 43.41, at 8-12. Larson provides the following
explanation:
[I]f the need being met by the legislation is regulation of collective
bargaining, the term "employee" may well include all workers for whom
such bargaining is normal and appropriate; and if the evil aimed at by the
legislation is insecurity confronting workers who may undergo temporary
unemployment, the term "employee" should include workers who, as a
matter of economic reality, are subject to that hazard.
Id.
162 See id. §§ 43.41-.51, at 8-11 to -25.
163 See infra notes 199-205 and accompanying text (applying test to the structure
of the garment industry).
161
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test.1
An analysis of the apparel industry with consideration to
both tests will provide the necessary framework for advancing
manufacturer liability for garment sweatshop conditions.
V. MANUFACTURER LIABILITY
A. Measures DirectedAgainst Manufacturers
The manufacturer-liability approach has already been the subject
of legislative and administrative attempts to enforce fair labor
standards. These legislative attempts by and large have been
ineffective because they either rely on inadequate enforcement
resources or have been rejected before enactment. In principle,
however, these attempts demonstrate that judicial imposition of
manufacturer liability does not mark a drastic departure from preexisting remedial notions.
1. Use of "Hot Goods" Sanctions
Under the so-called "hot goods" provision of the FLSA, 165 it
is unlawful for anyone to transport any goods produced in violation
of the provisions of the FLSA. Pursuant to this provision, federal
officials have successfully threatened apparel manufacturers with a
"hot goods" freeze on the shipment of their products unless they
pay back wages owed by the manufacturers' contractors, or barred
shipment altogether. 16 6 In California, for instance, the U.S.
Department of Labor's Wage and Hour Division has used the law to
crack down on not only sweatshop owners, but also manufacturers
who ship "hot goods" to retailers by barring the shipment of any
167
such goods.
Unfortunately, the "hot goods" provision is severely limited
because persons other than "employers" can only be sanctioned

1r4 See generally LARSON, supra note 132, § 43.54, at 8-32 (citing Haynie v. Tideland
Welding Serv., 631 F.2d 1242, 1244 (5th Cir. 1980) and Oilfield Safety & Mach.
Specialties, Inc. v. Harman Unlimited, Inc., 625 F.2d 1248, 1253-54 (5th Cir. 1980)).
165

166

See 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(1) (1988).
See Sward & Wallace, supra note 17, at A15 (outlining various attempts at

enforcement of federal labor standards by authorities). Until recently, the "hot
goods" provision has been used only infrequently in order to force sewing shop

owners to pay the minimum wage. Today, officials are testing its effectiveness against
wage, overtime, homework, and child labor violations. See Efron, supra note 120, at

A3. 167

See Efron, supranote 120, at A3; Clean Up the Sweatshops,supra note 101, at B6.
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through injunctions initiated by government enforcement agencies 168 and criminal penalties. 16 9 In fact, the Department of
Labor typically brings an injunctive suit against a manufacturer only
after sanctions against sweatshop owners have repeatedly led labor
officials to the same manufacturer. 17 Moreover, the FLSA limits
civil actions to actions brought against the "employer."17 1 Thus,
without judicial extension of liability under the FLSA to the
manufacturer, the garment worker is denied the opportunity to
initiate any civil action against the manufacturer.
The "hot goods" approach taken by federal labor officials
essentially provides for the enforcement of labor standards through
the imposition of liability on the manufacturer. At the very least,
therefore, current utilization of the "hot goods" provision signals
the recognition that one way of curbing sweatshop labor in the
apparel industry is to target the manufacturer. For the "hot goods"
approach to work effectively, however, sufficient resources must still
be dedicated to enforcement. Similarly, the success of other types
of legislation directed at the manufacturer, if enacted, would hinge
on the availability of adequate enforcement resources.
2. Current Legislative Proposals for Manufacturer Liability
Recently, the California legislature approved a bill targeted at
manufacturers. 172 It explicitly provided for the joint liability of
garment manufacturers for labor law violations committed by their
subcontractors.' 7" The bill, however, was vetoed by then Gover168 See 29 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1988) ("Administrator shall bring all actions under
section 217 [(injunction proceedings)] of this title to restrain violations of this
chapter."); see also id. § 217 (describing injunction proceedings); GAO, NEW YoRK
CITY, supra note 6, at 40-41 (explaining that the Department ofJustice is authorized
to bring criminal actions, but neither criminal sanctions nor civil injunctions are used
extensively).

169 See 29 U.S.C. § 216(a) (providing for fines and imprisonment).
170

See Joanna Ramey, Guess-LaborDept. ContractorPact Only the First, WOMEN'S

WEAR DAILY, Aug. 6, 1992, at 15 (statement ofJoe Villarreal, Department of Labor
regional administrator for Southern California).

7, See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (outlining actions brought by employees); id. § 216(c)
(describing actions brought by the government). Employees are limited to actions to
recover unpaid minimum wages or overtime compensation, and liquidated damages.
See id. § 216(b).
172 The bill was introduced by Assemblyman Tom Hayden (D) of Santa Monica
and aimed at cutting off the demand by manufacturers for sweatshop labor.
See Frammolino, Legislation, supra note 123, at A29; Ralph Frammolino, Sweatshop Bill
Approved, Awaits Governor's Decision, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 11, 1990, at A34.
173 The proposal targeted manufacturers because sweatshop owners often leave
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nor George Deukmejian. He rejected it on the basis that it would
place an "impossible" burden on manufacturers to police the
businesses of their subcontractors to ensure compliance with labor
standards. 174 Even more recently, Governor Pete Wilson vetoed
another bill 175 in the California legislature that would hold manufacturers liable for contractor labor law violations.
Holding manufacturers at least partly responsible, however, does
not necessarily compel manufacturers to bear the "impossible"
burden suggested by opponents of manufacturer liability. One way
of relieving that burden would be to hold manufacturers to a
general "reasonableness" standard under tort law. In other words,
a manufacturer would legally meet its burden by taking "reasonable"
actions, such as ensuring that it contracts only with lawfully
registered and licensed sewing shops. In addition, the manufacturer
could negotiate a fair contract price with the shop owner that would
exceed the costs to the shop owner of complying with at least the
minimum wage for each employee. Put into context, it is hardly
likely that a reasonableness standard would require the manufacturer to oversee every aspect of employment conditions in order to
17 6
comply with regulations or fulfill its duty.

workers stranded without even the meager earnings they had been promised and
"avoid the penalties by simply closing up shop" while "the manufacturer is free to
shop around for another contractor." See Frammolino, Legislation, supra note 123,
at A29.
174 See Frammolino, Legislation, supra note 123, at A29 (noting that former
Governor Deukmejian vetoed the bill because it put too much responsibility on
manufacturers).
175 Assembly Bill 1542, Cal. 1991-92 Regular Sess. (amended). The bill, sponsored
by Assemblyman Terry Friedman (D) of Los Angeles, provided that anyone engaged
in the business of garment manufacturing who contracts operations out to a
contractor will be liable to the same extent as the contractor for violations of labor
laws relating to wages, hours, industrial homework, minors, and general health and
safety. This time around, the rationale for rejecting the bill was that establishing
manufacturer liability "would 'only drive the garment industry out of state' to the
detriment of the employees and the state's economy." Daniel M. Weintraub, Governor
Rejects Bill on Needle Exchange, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1992, at A3 (quoting Governor
Wilson).
176 The Labor Department recently struck an unprecedented agreement with
Guess? Inc. which calls for Guess? to police its contractors to ensure that they do not
violate minimum wage, overtime, and child labor laws. See Ramey, supra note 170,
at 15; Stuart Silverstein, Guess?Pactto Curb Sweatshop Abuses Praised,L.A. TIMES, Aug.
6, 1992, at D3; DOL Agrees with Garment Maker's Plan to Police Its Contractorsfor
Violations of Labor Laws, Daily Lab. Rep., Aug. 6, 1992, at A-8. A question remains,
however, with respect to the diligence with which a large manufacturer such as Guess?
will supervise its contractors. See Silverstein, supra,at D3.
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On the other hand, if the manufacturer knows or has reason to
know177 that it does business with an unlicensed or unregistered
contractor, or if the manufacturer knows or has reason to know that
the contract price precludes the contractor from complying with
minimum wage standards, then the manufacturer should be held
liable for labor law violations resulting from its negligence. The
standard of reasonableness, as applied in any other context, would
178
not pose an "impossible" burden on apparel manufacturers.
The California bills discussed above appropriately frame the
issue of liability to include possible complicity by manufacturers.
Had the bills passed, however, they still would not have eliminated
the problem of relying on understaffed government departments for
enforcement. 179 The same can be said for other forms of legislation such as proposed criminal sanctions on manufacturers who
contract with shops that have been cited for multiple labor law
violations. Thus, without the imposition of liability on manufacturers by judicial interpretation of labor law, manufacturers will not
be effectively deterred from contracting with sweatshops and the
demand for sweatshop labor will prolong substandard working
conditions.
B. ProposalsforJudicialImposition of Manufacturer
Liabilityfor FLSA Violations
From a legislative policy-making standpoint, efforts to regulate
labor conditions in the apparel industry face the problems of
insufficient deterrence against contractors from operating sweatshops and lack of government resources to enforce existing
regulations. For these reasons, the judiciary must take affirmative
steps in order to effectuate legislative purposes.
In the absence of effective manufacturer liability legislation,
alternative theories can be used to extend adequate protection to
garment workers. This Comment proposes a sliding-scale system for
177 Alternatively, if several shops are found to be in violation of labor standards
contract with the same manufacturer, it would seem appropriate for some action to
be taken against that manufacturer since this would suggest a greater likelihood that
the manufacturer frequently imposes unreasonable contract terms or a greater

likelihood that the manufacturer knows, or has reason to know of the labor violations.
See, e.g., Ramey, supra note 170 and accompanying text (noting that frequency of
contracts to sweatshop operators can lead to injunctive action).
178 Such a standard would in no way impose strict liability-that is, holding the
maufacturer
accountable without any consideration of fault.
179 See supra notes 103-06 and accompanying text.
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determining manufacturer liability consisting of three steps: (1) the
use of the two determinative tests for employee-contractor status;
(2) the application of a tort or "reasonableness" standard to the
manufacturer's actions; and (3) an analysis of the public policies and
equitable principles involved in the structure of the apparel
industry.
1. Employee Versus Contractor Status
The initial determination to be made for purposes of the FLSA
is whether the sweatshop owner should be deemed an effective
employee of, or a truly independent contractor to, the manufacturer.
Under either of the two determinative tests (the right-to-controldetails test and the relative-nature-of-work test),180 a court may
find that the relationship between manufacturer and shop owner is
more like one between employer and employee than one between
client and contractor.
The finding of an employer-employee relationship would
ultimately make the manufacturer vicariously liable for violations of
the garment worker's labor rights under respondeat superior. This
would be analogous to a situation in which the shop owner acts as
an agent for the manufacturer. Another way to view the relationship would be to envision it as a joint employership 18 1 between
the manufacturer and the shop owner. Under this scheme, the
manufacturer and shop owner would be considered simultaneous
182
employers of the garment worker.

180 See supra notes 140-64 and accompanying text (discussing thejudicial develop-

ment of the tests).

181See infra notes 206-07 and accompanying text.
182

A district court noted:

Ajoint employment relationship is generally deemed to exist (1) where one
employer is acting directly or indirectly in the other's interest in relation to
the employee and (2) where the employers are "not completely disassociated
with respect to the employment of a particular employee and may be
deemed to share control of the employee, directly or indirectly, by reason
of the fact that one employer controls, is controlled by, or is under common
control with the other employer."
Maldonado v. Lucca, 629 F. Supp. 483, 487 (D.N.J. 1986) (quoting 29 C.F.R.
§ 791.2(b)(2), (3) (1986)).
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a. Manufacturers' Right to ControlDetails
i. Right-to-Control-Details Test
The basic question under the control-of-details test is whether
the degree of control of the details of production exceeds what is
necessary to obtain the desired result. 8 3 In the apparel industry,
examples of "details" would include pricing, volume of production,
turnaround time, and quality control.
The decisive factor under the control-of-details test is the
"ultimate right of control" and "not the overt exercise of that
right." 18 4 Indeed, the relevant measure of control is not the
degree of control actually exercised, but rather the "ultimate right
to dictate the method of work" 18 5 should the occasion to do so
arise.

18 6

The factors evidencing control include: the method of payment
(by time or by job),8 7 the furnishing of equipment, and the right
to fire.18 8 These factors, however, do not operate with equal
force in both directions-although strong evidence of any one of
these factors can by itself prove an employment relationship,
contrary evidence can only offer a mildly persuasive showing of
independent contractorship, if any. 9 For example, while the
furnishing of equipment by the superior is evidence of the existence
of an employer-employee relationship, the furnishing of equipment
by the subject (or lack of furnishing of equipment by the superior)
is not evidence of equal and opposite weight that the relationship
190
is an independent contractorship.

183

See LARSON, supra note 132, § 44.21, at 8-66 to -75; see also Davidson, supra

note 146, at 207 ("ITihe basic ingredient... is... the employer's right to direct the
manner of performance of the employee's duties.").
184 LARSON, supra note 132, § 44.00, at 8-43.
185 Id. § 44.10, at 8-63.
186 See id. at 8-43 to -63. For examples of cases where there is an exercise without
a right, or a right without it being exercised, see id. at 8-62 to -67.
187 Payment by time would indicate an employment relationship.
188
See LARSON, supra note 132, § 44.31, at 8-89.
189 See id. at 8-90 ("Independent contractorship... is established usually only by
a convincing accumulation of these and other tests, while employment.., can if
necessary often be solidly proved on the strength of one of the.., items...
'90 See id at 8-89, 8-90 (outlining the weight of individual factors).
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ii. Application to Garment Sweatshop Industry
Typically, the manufacturer pays the shop owner by the job or
piece19 1 and the shop owner furnishes the equipment, such as
sewing machines and pressers. In the absence of any direct
evidence of control, these factors appear to support a finding that
the shop owner is an independent contractor instead of an
employee relative to the manufacturer. But because the individual
factors evidencing control do not work with equal force in both
directions, 192 these two factors alone do not suffice for the determination of whether the shop owner is an employee or an independent contractor. Payment by the job or piece and supply of
equipment by the shop owner do not substantiate a contractorship
with as much force as payment by time and supply of equipment by
93
the manufacturer substantiate an employment relationship.1
Given these circumstances, a case can turn on the extent of the
manufacturer's right to terminate the contract or right to fire the
shop owner. 194 A case-by-case determination must be made as to
the manufacturer's right to fire, which is often enough to establish
Control (and therefore employment) need only be
control.
established by one principal factor, whereas independence (and
therefore contractorship) requires the "convincing accumulation" of
195
factors.
If employment status cannot be determined by the principal
factors, other considerations may become relevant. Factors such as
the use of unskilled labor, the frequency of contacts between
manufacturer and shop owner, and whether the manufacturer
provides designs, specifications, fabrics, or on-sight inspections can
contribute to a court's determination of whether a shop owner is
independent to determine if an employment relationship exists.
191 Shop owners are paid by the contracted job. See supra notes 34-37 and
accompanying text. For a description of the piecework wage system, see supra notes
72-74 and accompanying text.
192 See LARSON, supra note 132, § 44.31, at 8-89, 8-90; supra text accompanying
notes 189-90 (discussing how employment can be established based on the strength
of one factor as opposed to independent contractorship, which requires the
"convincing accumulation" of factors).
193 See LARSON, supra note 132, § 44.31, at 8-89, 8-90 (countering, again, the
assumption
that these tests work with equal force in both directions).
94
1 See, e.g., Real v. Driscoll Strawberry Assocs., 603 F.2d 748, 755 (9th Cir. 1979)
(using evidence that an employer can fire employees to substantiate a finding of an
employment relationship).
95 See LARSON, supra note 132, § 44.31, at 8-90.
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Some courts have inferred an employment status by focusing on the
employer's control of terms such as pricing, volume, and turnaround time."9 6 In the garment sweatshop industry, the manufacturer can usually dictate these terms of the contract because the
manufacturer possesses disproportionately greater bargaining power
than the shop owner. 197 This provides additional support for a
finding of an employment relationship.
In sum, the typical relationship between manufacturer and shop
owner in the garment industry, when viewed under the right-tocontrol-details test, reflects an employment relationship more
closely than an independent contractorship.
b. Relative Nature of Contractors' Work
i. Relative-Nature-of-Work Test
The movement towards the relative-nature-of-work test and away
from the right-to-control-details test19 does not detract from the
closeness between the manufacturer-shop owner relationship and an
employer-employee relationship. Two questions central to the
relative-nature-of-work test are: (1) whether the work constitutes an
integral part of the regular business of the employer; and (2)
whether the worker (shop owner) maintains an independent
business or provides a professional service. 199 The second question requires not only an examination of the shop owner or the job,
but also a determination of independence based on an assessment
of how separate and public the business service provided by the
200
shop owner is relative to the employer.

1

See, e.g., Johns v. Jarrard, 927 F.2d 551, 556 (1lth Cir.) (noting that, under
Georgia law, "a hospital may subject itself to vicarious liability for the malpractice of
its... physicians merely by assuming control over the time of their performance"),
reh'gdenied, 935 F.2d 1297 (1991); Dole v. Snell, 875 F.2d 802, 806 (10th Cir. 1989)
(noting that for cake decorators, "volume of cake orders determined the length of the
work day, including long overtime hours whenever necessary"); Usery v. Pilgrim
Equip., 527 F.2d 1308, 1312 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 826 (1976) (basing a
finding
of dependence on, among other things, the prices set by the employer).
19
7 See supra notes 38-46 and accompanying text; infra notes 214-18 and
accompanying
text.
198 See supra notes 149-64 and accompanying text.
199 See LARSON, supra note 132, § 45.00, at 8-193.
200 See id. § 45.31, at 8-234 (exemplifying this "theory of relativity" in the case of
a window washer who had one large customer in a clientele of small customers, and
thus had an employer-employee relationship with the large client).
9
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ii. Application to Garment Sweatshop Industry
Because the work being done by garment workers is an integral
part of the regular business of the manufacturer, and because the
shop owners do not furnish an independent business or professional
service relative to the manufacturer, an employment relationship
can be established. 20 1 The fact that the shop owners provide all
the labor except for design and marketing work underscores the
integral nature of the work provided by the sewing shop owners to
the manufacturer's business. 20 2 No contract, and thus no production, would exist without the shop owners. The integrated nature
of garment production in the retail apparel business and the
symbiotic relationship between the shop owner and manufacturer
support the view that the industry as a whole is a common enter2 03
prise.
Whether an individual shop owner furnishes an independent
business or professional service depends on the exclusiveness of the
contract, that is, whether the manufacturer buys most if not all of
the shop owner's production, or the extent to which the shop owner
201 See id. §45.00, at 8-193.
202 See Part II, supra, for a detailed

description of the garment industry. A district
court provided the following description:
The jobber is an independent business enterprise, havingits own employees
and its own labor-management relations. Similarly, the contractors and
subcontractors, as independent business concerns, operate their own shops.
Together they form a single integrated process of production; and, although
ostensibly separateand unrelated concerns, they are totally dependent upon each
otherfor theireconomic existence.
Yet, because the jobber initiates the manufacturing process, and
because the contractor relies entirely upon the jobber for its work, a
hierarchical structure, with the jobber at the pinnacle, evolved which lead
to abuses ....
The jobber doled out work to the lowest bidder, forcing
contractors to compete by reducing costs. The net result of this competition was the development of sweatshops in which employees worked for
substandard wages under substandard working conditions.
Botany Indus., Inc. v. New York Joint Bd., Amalgamated Clothing Workers, 375 F.
Supp. 485, 494 (S.D.N.Y.) (emphasis added), vacated on other groundssub nom. Robb
v. New York Joint Bd., 506 F.2d 1246 (2d Cir. 1974).
203 See e.g., Dole v. Snell, 875 F.2d 802, 811-12 (10th Cir. 1989) (holding that the
work of cake decorators is integral to the business of selling cakes); Brock v. Superior
Care, Inc., 840 F.2d 1054, 1059 (2nd Cir. 1988) (holding that nursing work is an
integral part of defendants's health care service).
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economically depends on the contract.2°4 This factor requires,
20 5
however, a case-by-case analysis.
c. Joint Employer Doctrine
If the above determinative tests do not sufficiently demonstrate
an employment relationship between manufacturer and shop owner,
courts can still impose manufacturer liability under the joint
employer doctrine using the standard set forth in Hodgson v. Griffin
& Brand of McAllen, Inc. 20 6 In determining that a crew leader and
a grower were joint employers of a farm worker, the court in
Hodgson held: "[I]ndependent contractor status does not necessarily
imply the contractor is solely responsible for his employees under
the Fair Labor Standards Act. Another employer may be jointly
20 7
responsible for the contractor's employees."
An examination of the total "economic reality" offers courts a
basis for establishing joint employership between manufacturer and
shop owner. This test, which would factor in the relative economic
and bargaining power of manufacturer and sweatshop owner into
the totality of the circumstances, may indicate that the sweatshop
owner is in reality little more than an agent of the manufacturer.
By focusing on the real power structure in the garment industry, the
manufacturer's immunity from liability for labor violations occurring in garment sweatshops can be penetrated.

2

04 The terms of the contract are dictated by the manufacturer, who has
disproportionately greater bargaining power than the shop owner. See infra notes
214-18 and accompanying text.
205 See, e.g., Fegley v. Higgins, 760 F. Supp. 617, 622 (E.D. Mich. 1991) ("Evaluating a worker's economic reality is a fancy way of asking what the worker's job is like.
A court need not rely on rote application of a balancing test in order to answer such
a simple question.").
2 Hodgson v. Griffin & Brand of McAllen, Inc., 471 F.2d 235 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 819 (1973); see also Real v. Driscoll Strawberry Assocs., 603 F.2d 748,
756 (9th Cir. 1979) ('[I]ndependent contractor status ...

does not ...

negate the

possibility that the contractee may be ajoint employer of those workers under the
FLSA.");supranotes 172-75 and accompanying text (proposed legislation intended to
make
2 0 manufacturers jointly liable).
7 Hodgson, 471 F.2d at 237 (citations omitted).
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2. Tort Approach to Manufacturers' Actions and Labor Violations
If a court fails to determine through either the right-to-controldetails or relative-nature-of-work test that the shop owner is closer
to an employee or joint employer than an independent contractor
relative to the manufacturer, then the court can turn to the
reasonableness of the manufacturer's actions. If the court determines the manufacturer acted unreasonably, then the manufacturer
will be held liable for the violations of the garment workers' rights
20 8
in the contractor's sweatshop.
As discussed earlier, the reasonableness of the manufacturer's
actions can be determined by the manner in which business is
conducted. A heightened industry standard of reasonableness can
be applied based on the manufacturer's resources, access to federal
or state documentation on garment shops, and ability to draft
contract terms that do not force sewing contractors to violate labor
209

standards.
This approach inevitably entails a sliding-scale determination of
the manufacturer's good faith dealings and its ability to determine
whether the contractor operates a sweatshop. Elements such as
those involved in joint tort liability210 can facilitate liability assessment. The relative contributions of the manufacturer and the
contractor towards the violation of FLSA standards can be used to
determine the extent of the manufacturer's liability. Under this

joint-tort-feasor approach, 2 11 a court can find relative liabilities
See supra notes 176-78 and accompanying and preceeding text (describing a
standard of reasonableness that would not pose an "impossible" burden on apparel
manufacturers).
209 Depending on the number of workers at a particular sewing shop and the costs
of maintaining that shop, one can assess whether the shop owner will be forced to pay
below minimum wage or assign industrial homework when given the required quality,
volume, turnaround time, and the desired profit margin of the product. The
following is an example based on a simple calculation: If the multiplicative product
of minimum wage and (wo)man-hours (based on quality and volume) exceeds the
contract price offered by the manufacturer, then chances are likely that the shop
owner who agrees to such a contract will violate minimum wage laws. "You must put
some of the burden on [those] who know it couldn't be made at legitimate operations
because it's just too cheap." Sward & Wallace, supra note 17, at A15 (statement of
Carl Priestland, chief economist for the American Apparel Manufacturers Association).
210 Joint liability is owed to a third party by two or more parties together where
208

by their common neglect the third party is injured. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §46, at 322-24 (5th ed. 1984).
211 The manufacturer and the shop owner can be jointly or severally liable for the
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based upon the calculation of pro rata contributions of the parties,
or simply transfer the entirety of damages incurred by the garment
212
worker to the more or most culpable party.
3. Public Policies and Equitable Principles
As a final test, in the event that the manufacturer is not found
liable under any of the above approaches, the court should consider
whether public policies or principles of equity may warrant a finding
of liability.
Supporters of imposing liability on manufacturers involved with
sweatshop contractors rely in part on a deep pocket analysis. The
manufacturer, unlike the sweatshop contractor, can pass the costs
of compliance with the FLSA on to consumers; therefore the
manufacturer is better able to bear the financial burden. Currently,
however, the apparel manufacturer merely reaps benefits from the
sweatshop system without shouldering any of the responsibilities for
the system's exploitation of garment workers. In essence, the
current system allows the social costs of sweatshop labor to be
borne by the sweatshop owners or operators and garment workers
instead of being more efficiently and equitably allocated upwards to
213
the manufacturers, retailers, and ultimately to consumers.
In addition to being the best risk allocator by virtue of having
the deepest pocket, the manufacturer, at the top of the apparel
industry structure, can also be deemed the party most culpable for
the violation of garment workers' labor rights because the manufacturer ultimately dictates the garment shop conditions by exercising
its power over the production contract. A primary consideration in
assessing the fairness of business contracts in the apparel industry
is the relative bargaining power of the parties. As discussed above,
the contractor generally has little or no bargaining power relative to
the manufacturer. 214 While contractors fight among themselves
in underbidding price wars in order to survive, the manufacturer
retains the luxury of conducting business wherever it is least
same injury to the garment worker. See id. § 47, at 326-28 (concluding that joint
liability is found where defendants had a common duty, even though each tortfeasor
may be sued severally).
212 See id. § 52, at 348-52 (illustrating situations where damages may be capable
of apportionment).
1 See supra note 148 and accompanying text (commenting on the efficiency of
vicarious liability).
214 See supra notes 38-46 and accompanying text.
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expensive. 2 15 Thus, the usual garment production contract contains terms dictated by the manufacturer, whose oversupply of
contractors2 16 grants it considerable leverage. The shop owner
complies with these terms because of a desperate fear of losing the
contract.
From a moral standpoint, the manufacturer condemns the
garment worker to substandard wages and employment conditions
when it sets the contract price unreasonably low relative to the
amount of labor needed and other costs involved. 2 17 Because
vicious competition among contractors enables the manufacturer to
play them against each other,2 18 contractors are forced to
"choose" between going out of business or maintaining substandard
shops. On the other hand, manufacturers are quite free to choose
among the available contractors with whom they will do business.
VI. NLRA GARMENT INDUSTRY PROVISO
The proposal to extend liability to the manufacturer under the
FLSA essentially crafts an exception to the employee-contractor
distinction for the apparel industry. In similar fashion, provisions in
2 19
the NLRA also make an exception for the apparel industry.
Therefore, apparel manufacturer liability for violations of the FLSA
would be consistent with the recognition of the peculiar nature of
the industry expressed in the NLRA.
The NLRA, which regulates relations between employers and
employees, defines and provides a comprehensive list of what
constitutes an "unfair labor practice." 220 The garment industry

215 See Dygert III & Shibata, supra note 33, at 64-65 (describing how the apparel
industry contracting system favors manufacturers).
216 A president of a women's wear manufacturer claims that a dozen garment
contractors come to his door each day to ask for business. See Efron, supra note 120,
at A19.
217 One high-ranking federal labor official noted:
[The manufacturers] know exactly how long it takes because they have
(sample makers) in their own shops who run through it to find out how
long it takes... They use that to beat the guys down .... They can figure
out the math, but they beat it down to the lowest price. They say, "If you
don't want to do it, fine, we'll go down the street to someone else."
Id. at A18-A19.
218 See Dygert III & Shibata, supra note 33, at 64; supra notes 38-46 and
accompanying text.
219 See 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1988) (explicitly exempting the apparel industry).
220 See id. § 158(a)-(b).
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exception,2 1 however, exempts labor organizations and employers in the apparel and clothing industry from prohibitions against
what would otherwise be unfair labor practices: secondary boy2 25
cotts222 and "hot cargo" agreements.
221 The garment industry proviso reads as follows:
[F]or the purposes of this subsection and subsection (b)(4)(B) of this section
the terms "any employer", "any person engaged in commerce or an industry
affecting commerce", and "any person" when used in relation to the terms
"any other producer, processor, or manufacturer", "any other employer", or
"any other person" shall not include persons in the relation of a jobber,
manufacturer, contractor, or subcontractor working on the goods or
premises of the jobber or manufacturer or performing parts of an
integrated process of production in the apparel and clothing industry.
Id. § 158(e) (second proviso).
A secondary boycott is defined as "[a]ny combination if its purpose and effect
are to coerce customers or patrons, or suppliers through fear of loss or bodily harm,
to withhold or withdraw their business relations from employer who is under attack."
BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1351 (6th ed. 1990). The NLRA, in detailing the
enforceability of contracts or agreements to boycott any other employer, provides
that:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for any labor organization and any
employer to enter into any contract or agreement, express or implied,
whereby such employer ceases or refrains or agrees to cease or refrain from
handling, using, selling, transporting or otherwise dealing in any of the

products of any other employer, or to cease doing business with any other
person, and any contract or agreement entered into heretofore or hereafter

containing such an agreement shall be to such extent unenforceable and
void ....
29 U.S.C. § 158(e).
2
A hot cargo agreement is defined as a "[violuntary agreement between union
and neutral employer by which latter agrees to exert pressure on another employer
with whom union has a dispute; by, for example, ceasing.., from.., dealing in any
of the products of any other employer the union has labeled as. . . 'hot'." BLACK's
LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 222, at 738.
The NLRA, in detailing unfair labor practices by labor organizations, provides
that:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its
agents(4)(i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed
by any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce
to engage in, a strike or a refusal in the course of his employment to use,
manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods,
articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services; or (ii) to
threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce or in an
industry affecting commerce, where in either case an object thereof is(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling,
handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other
producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other
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Courts have adhered to the protective language of the NLRA in
their analyses of the garment industry proviso. In Danielson v. Joint
Board of Coat, Suit and Allied Garment Workers' Union,224 the Second
Circuit reversed an injunction restraining a garment workers' union
from picketing a jobber for its refusal to agree to limit itself to
union contractors. 225
The court emphasized the garment
workers' need for hot cargo agreements because of the uniquely

oppressive nature of the industry. 226 The court also turned to the
legislative history of the NLRA, deferring to the argument that
"[t]he ban on secondary boycotts... 'is merely intended to prevent
...
injuring a third person who is [not] involved in any way in the
dispute'" and "'is not intended to apply to a case where the third
party is, in effect, in cahoots with or acting as a part of the primary
employer.'" 227 The court concluded that secondary picketing is
"clearly permissible" in the garment industry. 228
The Danielson holding is consistent with the Ninth Circuit's
earlier holding in Construction Laborers Union v. NLRB 22 9 that the
NLRA permits, in the garment industry, picketing "not only to

person, or forcing or requiring any other employer to recognize or bargain with
a labor organization as the representative of his employees ....
29 U.S.C. § 158(b).
224 Danielson v. Joint Bd. of Coat, Suit & Allied Garment Workers' Union, 494
F.2d 1230 (2d Cir. 1974).
25 See id. at 1230-31.
226 Judge Friendly wrote for the majority:

Garment manufacturers, in an effort to avoid unionization, largely
abandoned their "inside shops," transformed themselves into jobbers, and
then engaged contractors to do the actual manufacturing. "Thejobber had
no direct dealing with employees, was not responsible to them for wages,
and was unconcerned with hours and adequate standards ....
The
contractors were in fierce competition with one another for the patronage
of jobbers and inside manufacturers. The essential basis of this intense
competition was reduced labor costs. The brunt of this economic rivalry
was borne by the workers and reflected itself in depressed wages and
substandard labor conditions." Since unionization of one contractor would
be ineffective if the jobber could turn to a non-union competitor, the
weapon developed by the union to meet this was to require the jobber to
agree to deal only with unionized contractors.
Id. at 1234 (quoting Greenstein v. National Skirt & Sportswear Ass'n, 178 F. Supp.
681, 687 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), appeal dismissed, 274 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1960)).
227 Id. at 1235 (quoting 95 CONG. REc. 8709 (1949) (statement of Senator Taft on
proposed amendments to the newly enacted Taft-Hartley Act)).
8 Id. at 1235.
2 323 F.2d 422 (9th Cir. 1963).
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secure an agreement but also to enforce it."23 0 On the other
hand, in all other industries except construction, picketing either to
secure or enforce an agreement is prohibited. 3 1
The garment industry proviso in the NLRA and its judicial
interpretation 232 exemplify the need to provide special consideration for the protection of the garment sweatshop worker because
of the nature of the apparel industry. Without similar exceptional
treatment under the FLSA or some other form of meaningful and
effective legislation, the garment worker's labor rights will remain
unprotected.
CONCLUSION

The persistence and prevalence of sweatshop conditions in the
domestic apparel industry compels a more rigorous search for
remedies for the injuries suffered by the garment sweatshop worker,
the supplier of sweatshop labor. While the garment worker
continues to tolerate substandard working conditions, the approach
to solving the sweatshop problem must be taken from the demand
side in addition to the supply side. Limiting the enforcement of
labor laws to putting the responsibility solely on the sweatshop
owner or operator is inadequate because of the unique nature of the
industry. In order to effectively control the demand for sweatshop
labor, the apparel manufacturer-the true beneficiary of the garment
sweatshop system-must be held accountable for the detriment to
the worker that corresponds to its own benefit.

230 Id. at 424.
231 See id. at 425.
2 2
3 See Botany Indus. v. New YorkJoint Bd., 375 F. Supp. 485, 494-95 (S.D.N.Y.)

(commenting on how "hot cargo" contracts, in the apparel industry developed in
order to force employers to operate under union contracts), vacated on othergrounds
sub. nom. Robb v. New York Joint Bd., 506 F.2d 1246 (2d Cir. 1974); Employing
Lithographers v. NLRB, 301 F.2d 20, 26 (5th Cir. 1962) (describing how the apparel

industry's oversupply of contractors led to substandard working conditions which
could only be improved by "hot cargo" contracts requiring them to unionize).

